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SHOULD POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS BE ACCORDED
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IMMUNITY?
Melvyn R. Durchslag*
INTRODUCTION
Local autonomy has recently returned to occupy center stage in
constitutional discourse. But it was not always this way. While a, if
not the, central focus of the 1787 constitutional debate concerned
state autonomy from the assertion of federal authority,1 the lan-
guage of some early Marshall Court opinions seemed less than sym-
pathetic to state autonomy concerns.' But beginning with its review
of the Sherman Antitrust Act of 18 9 0 ,a the Supreme Court reor-
dered the balance between federal and state power from that con-
templated by the Marshall Court.4 Concerns for local autonomy
even infected the Court's interpretation of individual rights during
much of the period from the Reconstruction to the Warren Court
era .
5
* Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. I appreciate the thought-
ful comments made by Erwin Chemerinsky, Bill Marshall, and Gene Shreve on earlier drafts of
this paper. I also thank Jennifer Michalski (now esq.) and Michael Shenabruch for their valuable
research assistance.
I. See, e.g., Robert F. Nagle, Federalism as a Fundamental Value: National League of Cities
in Perspective, 1981 SuP. CT. REv. 81, 99-100 (discussing the Framers's views of the role of states
in the federal system).
2. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196-97 (1824) (holding Congress's powers
under Art. I, § 8 to be plenary); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 418-22 (1819)
(holding that Congress has wide discretion in determining the appropriate means to implement
delegated powers).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
4. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (stating that mining is not consid-
ered commerce); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (holding that child labor standards
are not a federal concern despite the destination of the goods produced), overruled by United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895)
(holding that sugar refining was not commerce "among the states" despite the fact that the re-
fined sugar was destined to be shipped out of state).
5. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 352 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring) (expres-
sing concern with applying an entire portion of federal law to the states and recognizing the need
for state autonomy); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 66-67 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring) (refusing to extend the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination to the states),
overruled by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36
(1873) (giving great deference to state police power). See generally Melvyn R. Durchslag, Feder-
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The Great Depression and the perceived need for a national eco-
nomic response once more changed the tenor of the political debate.
And the Court seemingly ended the constitutional debate over Con-
gress's authority to regulate the national economy when, in United
States v. Darby,' it declared the Tenth Amendment to be nothing
more than "a truism."' Even direct federal imposition on states
themselves seemed to cause few ripples8 until, in 1976, the Court
declared Congress's attempt to extend the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 19381 to state and local governments unconstitutional as a
violation of the once-thought moribund Tenth Amendment.1"
The local autonomy/federalism subject was thus reopened for
constitutional debate. Doctrinally, the debate has been kept alive by
the Court's inability to agree on the extent to which protections
against federal overreaching ought to rest on the protections af-
forded by the political process, as opposed to judicially articulated
and enforced constitutional norms." Now the debate is far more
than doctrinal. In 1977, one year after National League of Cities v.
Usery,'2 Professors Laurence Tribe and Frank Michelman indepen-
dently reached the intriguing conclusion that National League can
only be sensibly understood as a statement of individual constitu-
tional entitlement to a basic level of services from local govern-
alism and Constitutional Liberties: Varying the Remedy to Save the Right, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV.
723 (1979) (criticizing the Court for contracting the scope of individual liberties in deference to
state and local autonomy).
6. 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (holding that Congress has the power under the Commerce Clause to
regulate such matters of national economy as child labor laws as long as they affect commerce or
are necessary and proper to the regulation of commerce).
7. Id. at 124.
8. See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946) (holding that a state is not immune
from federal tax on its sale of mineral waters). But see Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559 (1911)
(stating that Congress has no authority to impose the location for a state capital as a condition of
admission into the Union).
9. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1988).
10. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
11. Compare Garcia, 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (overruling National League) with New York v.
United States, 12 S. Ct. 2408, 2420 (1992) (distinguishing Garcia on the ground that "this is not
a case in which Congress has subjected a State to the same legislation applicable to private par-
ties"). Why that should matter given Garcia's reliance on the political process as adequate protec-
tion for the states' autonomy interests is not explained. But see New York, 112 S. Ct. at 2443-44
(White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining that the Act was passed at the
insistence of the states' governors). See also H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of Consti-
tutional Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 633, 652-81 (1993) (criticizing the Court's reasoning, if not the
result, in New York v. United States).
12. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S.
528 (1985).
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ment.' a Moreover, local autonomy has become the centerpiece of re-
publican constitutional theorists who see local governments, or even
"sub-governments" (neighborhoods, for example), as the only venue
in which republican discourse can occur.14 Federalism, a term which
in its traditional setting has been used to express a relationship be-
tween the federal government and the states, consequently has taken
on a new dimension. Because a political system founded on republi-
can discourse can only occur within "a polity small enough for the
entire citizenry to engage in face-to-face political discussion,"'15 the
relationship between the state and its local governmental units has
also become a subject of increased interest. Indeed, it has become
part and parcel of the larger debate on federalism values.16
It is where the federal/state, federal/local, and state/local con-
versations intersect that the Eleventh Amendment 7 becomes of
some interest, for current Eleventh Amendment doctrine contains
elements of all three conversations. As to the first, the Eleventh
Amendment - in oversimplified (and to that extent erroneous)
terms - prohibits the exercise of federal judicial power directly
against a state, thus creating an area of state autonomy from fed-
eral judicial authority. But as to the second, the Eleventh Amend-
13. Frank 1. Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutations of "Sovereignty" in
National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L. J. 1165 (1977); Laurence Tribe, Unravelling
National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government
Services, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1977) [hereinafter Tribe, New Federalism].
14. E.g., GRANT MCCONNELL. PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 91-118 (1967);
MARK TUSHNET. RED, WHITE AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 11-12
(1988); Kathryn Abrams, Law's Republicanism, 97 YALE L. J. 1591, 1604 n.6 (1988); Richard
H. Fallon, Jr., What is Republicanism, and is it Worth Reviving?, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1695, 1723-
25 (1989); S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. L.
REV. 685, 710-14 (1991).
15. James G. Pope, Republican Moments: The Role of Direct Popular Power in the American
Constitutional Order, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 287, 298 (1990).
16. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I - The Structure of Local Government Law,
90 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1990) (studying the legal powers and social and political ramifications of
the local government system) [hereinafter Briffault, Part 1]; Richard Briffault, Our Localism:
Part II - Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346 (1990) (discussing local govern-
ment law in relation to federal power) [hereinafter Briffault, Part 1I]; Gerald E. Frug, The Judi-
cial Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 718-32 (1978) [hereinafter Frug, Power of the
Purse] (discussing the expansion of the federal courts' powers and their influence on society);
Hoke, supra note 14, at 714-52 (arguing that federal preemption decisions impede state and local
government and undermine citizens' rights to participate in the democratic process).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The text provides:
The Judicial Power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citi-
zens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
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ment affords no similar immunity to any local governing unit below
the state;"' at least as far as federal judicial power is concerned,
local political subdivisions of the state have no autonomy. As I will
demonstrate, the reason for this rather confusing distinction is the
third element, the relationship between the state and its local politi-
cal subdivisions - a relationship which is, and ultimately must be,
defined according to state rather than federal norms.
Modern commentators have had very little good to say about the
1890 case of Lincoln County v. Luning,19 in which the Supreme
Court drew a distinction between the immunity of the state and that
of its political subdivisions.20 In his 1987 treatise on the Eleventh
Amendment, Professor John Orth noted that the "distinction in
Eleventh Amendment law between cities and counties on the one
hand and states on the other produces bizarre results."21 Gerald
Frug, perhaps the leading academic advocate for an increased role
for local political subdivisions in our governing structure, described
the Lincoln County doctrine as an "extraordinary anomaly."22 In
the only extensive law review commentary on the matter, a student
essay in the Duke Law Journal some fifteen years ago argued that
the rule of Lincoln County "furthers no [E]leventh [A]mendment
goals and is contrary to sound principles of federalism. 2 a
There is something to be said for these criticisms. At the same
time the Court has continued its adherence to Lincoln County, in
other contexts it uses federalism principles to protect local political
subdivisions from federal authority, both judicial and legislative. 4
18. Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890) (distinguishing the immunity of states
from political subdivisions). Ironically, Lincoln County was decided the same day as Hans v. Loui-
siana, 134 U.S. I (1890), a case in which the Court significantly expanded the Eleventh Amend-
ment by holding that, the text notwithstanding, a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity extends
to suits against a state by any person, citizen or noncitizen. It did so by holding that the Eleventh
Amendment constitutionalized a general principle of state sovereign immunity. Id. at 21.
19. 133 U.S. 529 (1890).
20. Id. at 530.
21. JOHN V. ORTH. THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES 119 (1987) [hereinafter
ORTH. JUDICIAL POWER].
22. Frug, Power of the Purse, supra note 16, at 756. See also Vicki C. Jackson, One Hundred
Years of Folly: The Eleventh Amendment and the 1988 Term. 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 51, 57 n.23
(1990) [hereinafter Jackson, One Hundred Years of Folly] (describing Lincoln County as a "doc-
trinal anomaly").
23. Margreth Barrett, Comment, The Denial of Eleventh Amendment Immunity to Political
Subdivisions of the States: An Unjustified Strain on Federalism, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1042, 1069
[hereinafter Barrett, Immunity to Political Subdivisions].
24. Compare Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299 (1990) (stating that
a bi-state entity created to operate certain transportation facilities enjoys Eleventh Amendment
[Vol. 43:577
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In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 5 the
Court refused - largely for reasons of federalism 6 - to find that
Texas's local property tax scheme for financing public schools vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause despite wide disparities in the
educational resources available to local school districts. In National
League,"7 the Court suggested that because local political subdivi-
sions derive their authority and power from their respective states
"and are thus 'subordinate arms' of state government,"2 8 federal in-
terference in their decision-making is protected by the Tenth
Amendment. All of this, however, has had no influence on how the
Court has decided cases in which local governmental units claim the
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity defense in federal court.
The apparently unanimous and certainly consistent adherence to
a doctrine which has been as widely criticized as Lincoln County
and which, on the surface, is inconsistent with concerns for values of
federalism expressed in other constitutional contexts would suggest
at least doctrinal incoherence (not surprising under the Eleventh
Amendment), if not blind, slavish adherence to outworn precedent.
However, when one focuses on the history and structure of the vari-
ety of local governmental units and how that meshes with both his-
torical and contemporary justifications for state sovereign immunity
under the Eleventh Amendment, the arguments, which some might
think compel a reconsideration of Lincoln County, are far less per-
suasive than they appear at first blush. Moreover, the countervailing
concern for preserving a federal remedy for victims of a local gov-
immunity, although it was waived in this case) with Lake County Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 401 (1979) (holding that "[i]f an interstate compact discloses
that the compacting States created an agency comparable to a county or municipality, . . . the
[Eleventh] Amendment should not be construed to immunize such an entity") and Mt. Healthy
City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (holding that a school board is not.
immune from suit). Cf Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982)
(holding that a city with "home rule" status is not immune from federal antitrust liability under
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943)).
25. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
26. Id. at 40-44; see also Nollan v. California Costal Comm'n., 483 U.S. 825, 866-67 (1987)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Takings Clause should not be interpreted so as to dis-
able local governments from performing their regulatory functions); First English Lutheran Evan-
gelical Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304, 340-41 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(holding that the Court's Takings Clause jurisprudence will inhibit local regulatory actions benefi-
cial to the public welfare).
27. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
28. Id. at 844 n.20; see also Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40,
60-71 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that local political subdivisions should have the
same immunity from federal antitrust liability that states enjoy).
1994]
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ernment's excesses may outweigh any real or symbolic benefits
which accrue to local political subdivisions by extending them full
Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Part I of this Article looks at the Lincoln County decision itself
and attempts to place that decision in its historical and doctrinal
context. Viewed in this light, Lincoln County hardly seems anoma-
lous; this is certainly not the case when it is viewed through the eyes
of the nineteenth century Justices who decided the case. Part II
analyzes the three major textual or structural arguments which
might support overruling Lincoln County, but concludes that none
are persuasive. Part III looks at the issue in a more functional way,
assessing arguments which attempt to establish an identity between
the state and its political subdivisions, both in terms of functions
performed and the fiscal relationship between them. This part also
briefly assesses the consistency between Lincoln County and local
government as the venue for the realization of republican values of
self-government. Finally, Part IV argues that if Lincoln County is to
be reconsidered, the likely result will be the sacrifice of legal relief
for violations of individual liberties under Section 1983 of the Civil
Rights Act29 and Monell v. Department of Social Services.0
I. LINCOLN COUNTY IN CONTEXT
The Supreme Court in Lincoln County"1 devoted four paragraphs
to enunciating and explaining its ruling that the Eleventh Amend-
ment does not extend its jurisdictional proscription to local political
subdivisions.3 2 Three reasons emerge from those four paragraphs.
The first is precedent: "[T]he records of this court for the last thirty
years are full of suits against [political subdivisions], and it would
seem as though by general consent the jurisdiction of the Federal
courts . . had become established. 3 3 The second also derives from
precedent, but of a somewhat different nature: based on In Re
Ayers,"4 in which the Court limited the applicability of the Eleventh
Amendment to cases in which the state is the real party in interest,
the Lincoln County Court said that since the county was not the
29. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
30. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
31. Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890).
32. Id. at 530-31.
33. Id. at 530.
34. 123 U.S. 443 (1887).
[Vol. 43:577
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state, the Eleventh Amendment was inapplicable. 5 The third reason
is the most significant to a historical understanding (and justifica-
tion) of Lincoln County: the Court's clarification of the state and its
political subdivisions as being totally distinct entities.3 This is re-
flected in the somewhat cryptic statement that "[the county] is a
part of the State only in that remote sense in which any city, town,
or other municipal corporation may be said to be a part of the
State."37
It is difficult to understand the Court's first two reasons. As to the
first, while it is true that the Court had consistently decided that
individuals could sue local political subdivisions despite the Eleventh
Amendment, 8 it is also true that the Court had previously upheld,
admittedly somewhat less consistently, individual suits against
states. 9 Consequently, if the Court felt free that same day to ignore
this other group of precedents in deciding Hans v. Louisiana," it
35. Lincoln County, 133 U.S. at 530.
36. Id.
37. Id. (emphasis added).
38. E.g., Scotland County v. Hill, 132 U.S. 107 (1889) (allowing a suit against a county to
recover on bond coupons that it issued); Smith v. Bourbon County, 127 U.S. 105 (1888) (allowing
a suit against a county to compel issuance of bonds); Nemaha County v. Frank, 120 U.S. 41
(1887) (holding that interest coupons are the obligation of the county); Ackley School Dist. v.
Hall, 113 U.S. 135 (1885) (allowing a suit against a school district for recovery of the principal
and interest due on a bond); Blair v. Cuming County, III U.S. 363 (1864) (allowing a suit
against a county to recover on bonds); Chickaming v. Carpenter, 106 U.S. 663 (1883) (allowing a
suit against a township to recover on unpaid bonds and coupons); Thompson v. Perrine, 106 U.S.
589 (1883) (allowing a suit against a town to recover on unpaid bonds); Davenport v. Dodge
County, 105 U.S. 237 (1882) (allowing a suit against a county to recover on bond coupons);
Cromwell v. County of Sac, 96 U.S. 51 (1877) (allowing a suit against a county for recovery on
unpaid bonds).
39. E.g., Rolston v. Missouri Fund Comm'rs, 120 U.S. 390 (1887) (allowing a suit to compel a
state officer to perform a nondiscretionary act), overruled in part by Pennhurst St. Sch. & Hosp.
v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984); Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550 (1886) (allowing a suit
against a state for trespass when, after refusing to accept the state's own bond coupon in tax
payment, a state official entered the plaintiff's land and removed his horse); Allen v. Baltimore 0.
R.R., 114 U.S. 311 (1885) (granting an injunction against a state after the state refused to accept
its own bond coupons in tax payment); Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U.S. 269 (1885) (declaring
unconstitutional a statute forbidding acceptance of the state's own bond coupons in tax payment);
Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436 (1883) (holding that a state waived its immunity when it inter-
vened as a claimant, not when it merely appeared to protest jurisdiction); Board of Liquidation v.
McComb, 92 U.S. 531 (1873) (issuing a writ of mandamus compelling a state official to perform
a nondiscretionary duty); Davis v. Gray, 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 203 (1872) (allowing a suit in equity
seeking to enjoin a state from granting certain lands to third parties after allegedly granting them
to a railroad).
40. 134 U.S. I (1890) (denying federal jurisdiction in a suit brought against a state by a resi-
dent citizen for reasons of sovereign immunity). Several authors have described Hans as a case
which grew out of the "Compromise of 1877," which resulted in the selection of Rutherford B.
Hayes as President over Samuel J. Tilden. The selection was made by an Electoral Commission
1994]
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could have just as easily ignored "the last thirty years" '41 and de-
cided Lincoln County the other way. As for the second argument, In
Re Ayers42 merely held that the state has to be the real party in
interest in order to implicate the Eleventh Amendment. The Court
had nothing whatsoever to say about whether the state and its politi-
cal subdivisions were sufficiently identified, either de facto or de
jure, to justify holding that a suit against a political subdivision is a
suit against the state. That still leaves the third reason given by the
Lincoln County Court, that the state is a totally distinct entity from
its political subdivisions. In order to assess this reason, Hans must
be briefly revisited. In doing so, it is also necessary to briefly discuss
the concept of sovereignty and how the 1890 legal mind viewed the
sovereignty of local political subdivisions. For it is sovereignty which
ultimately undergirds Hans and explains Lincoln County."3
consisting of ten elected representatives, five senators, five House members, and five Supreme
Court Justices. The major agreement which "bought" Southern support for Hayes was the prom-
ise of home rule for the South, which meant no more federal interference - executive or legisla-
tive - in the affairs of the southern states. The judiciary, seeing no possibility of enforcing their
orders in such a political environment, followed suit. In the fiscal arena, this meant no judicial
interference with attempts to repudiate debts contracted by the newly dispossessed reconstruction
legislatures. See ORTH. JUDICIAL POWER, supra note 21, at 47-109 (discussing American law and
federalism during the Reconstruction era); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State
Sovereign Immunity. A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1976-91 (1983) (discussing
repudiation, the Court's reactions, and the ensuing "Constitutional crisis"). Professor Orth ex-
plained the exception for local political subdivisions as the inability of "[s]parsely settled counties
in politically insignificant states [to] command the sympathies of the highest powers in the na-
tion." ORTH. JUDICIAL POWER, supra note 21, at 118. Judge Gibbons described it as an attempt
by the Court to keep the securities markets stable. Gibbons, supra, at 2001-02.
41. Lincoln County, 133 U.S. at 530.
42. 123 U.S. 443 (1887).
43. Criticism of Hans has occupied a number of scholars and has filled law review and book
pages for many years. A concern for time and space permits only a few citations. E.g., CLYDE E.
JACOBS. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY (1972); ORTH. JUDICIAL
POWER. supra note 21; MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCA-
TION OF JUDICIAL POWER 139-54 (1980); Akhil R. Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism. 96
YALE L.J. 1425 (1987); Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immu-
nity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515 (1978) [hereinafter Field, Immunity Doctrines];
Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Congres-
sional Imposition of Suit Upon the States, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1203 (1978) [hereinafter Field,
Congressional Imposition]; Gibbons, supra note 40; Jackson, One Hundred Years of Folly, supra
note 22; Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign
Immunity, 98 YALE L. J. I (1988) [hereinafter Jackson, Sovereign Immunity]; Calvin R. Massey,
State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. CHI L. REV. 61 (1989); John
E. Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes of Action Against State Govern-
ments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM L. REV. 1413
(1975); Gene R. Shreve, Letting Go of the Eleventh Amendment, 64 IND. L. J. 601 (1989). Some
of the authors, most notably Professors Amar, Field, Jackson, Orth, and Judge Gibbons, entirely
reject the notion that the Eleventh Amendment "constitutionalized" state sovereign immunity.
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However, one reads the conflicting historical evidence regarding
whether the Framers expected state sovereign immunity to survive
the specific language of Article III, it is undeniable that there was
in 1787 . . . a robust debate over the nature of sovereignty. Certain Feder-
alists . . . were out-spoken in their conviction that sovereignty was exclu-
sively vested in the people of the nation as a whole. The anti-Federalists
were equally fervid in their contention that the states possessed sovereignty
that ought not be compromised by constitutional union."
This debate was not resolved in Philadelphia. The "great" opinions
of the Marshall Court - McCulloch v. Maryland,45 Cohens v. Vir-
ginia,46 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,47 and Gibbons v. Ogden48 - car-
ried that debate from the convention to the federal judiciary. No
less a part of that debate were Chisholm v. Georgia49 and, subse-
quently, Hans v. Louisiana.50 To be sure, Chisholm and Hans each
had a far narrower focus than cases such as McCulloch and Gib-
bons. The former were cases where states had defaulted on obliga-
tions they had issued and were subsequently sued by individual
creditors. The major factual difference between Hans and Chisholm
was that Chisholm was a nonresident of Georgia and claimed fed-
eral jurisdiction as a result of diversity of citizenship51 while Hans, a
resident of Louisiana, relied on the Contracts Clause in asserting
Others such as Professor Nowak accept state sovereign immunity as a constitutional proposition
but argue that Congress can waive that immunity pursuant to its constitutionally-granted legisla-
tive authority. Professors Massey and Redish part company with Professor Nowak. Professor Red-
ish argues that Hans is simply wrong in its extension of the Constitution's language but argues
that Congress has no power to waive immunity in suits against the state by citizens of other states.
Professor Massey agrees with Professor Redish but argues that questions of state immunity be-
yond the Eleventh Amendment's text should be resolved under the Tenth Amendment. Professor
William Marshall, on the other hand, seems unconvinced by any of the arguments which criticize
Hans, and thus is prepared to support the Court's current stance. See William P. Marshall, The
Diversity Theory of the Eleventh Amendment: A Critical Evaluation, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1372
(1989).
44. Massey, supra note 43, at 97.
45. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (upholding the Constitutional grant of power to Congress to
establish a second bank of the United States).
46. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) (holding that federal courts may exercise jurisdiction over
the states when federal questions are raised).
47. 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304 (1816) (holding that federal courts have the power to review the
constitutionality of state government actions).
48. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (using a broad construction of the First Amendment to hold
that Congress's power to regulate commerce extends to any activity which even indirectly affects
interstate commerce).
49. 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1793) (upholding federal jurisdiction in a suit brought against a state
by a nonresident individual without the state's consent).
50. 13"4 U.S. 1 (1890).
51. Chisolm, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) at 420.
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federal question jurisdiction.52 The questions, however, were essen-
tially the same - whether the constitutional structure, informed by
concerns for preserving state sovereignty, permitted an interpreta-
tion of Article III that allowed an individual to sue an unconsenting
state. Like McCulloch, then, both Chisholm and Hans rested on
structural assumptions about the intersection of federal authority
and state autonomy.53 That the essential dispute was over conflicting
"sovereignties" is evident from the opinions in both Chisholm and
Hans. James Wilson - who argued so strongly for ratification in
the Pennsylvania Constitutional Convention - wrote as Justice
Wilson in Chisholm, that the "question . . . [is] no less radical
than this - 'do the People of the United States form a Nation?' 954
Chief Justice John Jay echoed Justice Wilson's federalist concep-
tions of sovereignty, noting that the people acting as sovereigns cre-
ated a governmental structure which bound states to the dictates of
federal law, thus allowing a citizen to sue a state in federal court.55
On the other side, Justice James Iredell, the lone dissenter in
Chisholm, wrote that "[e]very State in the Union in every instance
where its sovereignty has not been delegated to the United States, I
consider to be completely sovereign. . . . The United States are
sovereign as to all the powers of Government actually surrendered:
Each state in the Union is sovereign as to all the powers reserved." 6
Nearly one hundred years later, Justice Joseph Bradley, speaking
for the Court in Hans, said that the Chisholm Court had gotten it
52. Hans, 134 U.S. at 10.
53. A number of scholars have disputed the Hans Court's conclusion that the Eleventh Amend-
ment constitutionalized sovereign immunity. See supra note 43 (citing authors who have criticized
the Hans decision). They argue instead that the Eleventh Amendment was designed only to re-
strict federal jurisdiction based on the identity of the parties. In terms of sovereign immunity,
Professors Field and Jackson argue that Chisholm's mistake, if there was one, was its failure to
recognize the state sovereign immunity defense as a matter of federal common law. See Field,
Congressional Imposition, supra note 43; Field, Immunity Doctrines, supra note 43; Jackson, One
Hundred Years of Folly, supra note 22; Jackson, Sovereign Immunity, supra note 43.
54. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 453.
55. Id. at 471. This interpretation of our constitutional history and structure was reiterated by
Chief Justice John Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). Arguing
that the federal government was created by the sovereign states voluntarily ceding powers to it,
the state of Maryland asserted that federal power should be narrowly construed in deference to
the sovereign prerogatives of the state. The Court, however, had a different version of the creation
of the federal government and the source of its powers. Chief Justice Marshall argued that the
federal government was created by the sovereign people who allocated authority between the fed-
eral government and the states, and there was consequently no reason to narrowly construe federal
authority; the states, not being the sovereigns in our constitutional scheme, had no greater claim
to governmental authority than did the federal government. Id. at 404-06.
56. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 435 (Iredell, J., dissenting).
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all wrong, misapprehending the locus of sovereignty and thus reach-
ing the wrong conclusion as to whether the structure of the Consti-
tution contemplated a state's sovereign immunity.57 Quoting Alex-
ander Hamilton's Federalist No. 81, Justice Bradley wrote:
It is inherent in the nature of [a state's] sovereignty not to be amenable to
the suit of an individual without its consent. This is the general sense and
the general practice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes
of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every State in the
Union. 8
Little has changed in the last century; the concept of state sover-
eignty simpliciter remains a part of Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence. 9
57. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 12 (1890).
58. Id. at 13.
59. One illustration is the Eleventh Amendment's prohibition against suing a state in its own
name even for injunctive relief, despite the Court's adherence to the prospective/retrospective re-
lief distinction when state officers are sued in their official capacities. Compare Ford Motor Co. v.
Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945) (stating that in a suit for recovery of money from
the Treasury, the state is a real party in interest and is protected by the Eleventh Amendment)
and Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18 (1933) (holding that a state's immunity extends to suits which
are quasi in rem, absent a waiver by the state) with Edelman v. Jordan 415 U.S. 651 (1974)
(holding that a judgment to be paid out of a state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment
even though the state is not a party). But cf. Hafer v. Melo, 112 S. Ct. 358 (1991) (stating that
the Eleventh Amendment does not bar a damage claim against a state officer if the suit is filed
against her in her individual capacity, even for actions taken in her official capacity). When a
state officer is sued to enjoin enforcement of an unconstitutional statute, the "real party in inter-
est" is the state just as much as it is when a state officer is sued for retrospective monetary relief
to be paid from the state treasury. This anomaly can only be resolved by creating a fiction that the
state officer's actions are ultra vires when attempting to enforce an unconstitutional statute. The
Court did just this in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See generally LAURENCE TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-27, at 189-92 (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter TRIBE, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW] (discussing the significance of Ex Parte Young). However, this fiction does not
purge the anomaly. The state, like any corporation, cannot act except through its officers, whether
they be executive, legislative, or judicial. When enforcing a state statute, these officers are acting
for the state and with the state's explicit authority. Therefore, the only basis for the distinction is
that it is inconsistent with traditional notions of sovereignty to force a state to defend a suit when
it has not agreed to do so. See Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934) (hold-
ing that the Eleventh Amendment prohibits suits in federal court by foreign nations against states
despite a lack of textual proscription); Ex Parte New York, 256 U.S. 490 (1921) (holding that
admiralty jurisdiction is barred by the Eleventh Amendment despite the fact that such suits are
neither in law nor equity). But cf. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979) (holding that the Elev-
enth Amendment does not prohibit one state's citizens from suing another state in the courts of
the former party's residence). Dissenting in Nevada v. Hall, Justice Harry Blackmun found an
interstate sovereign immunity in general principles of federalism. Id. at 430-31 (Blackmun, J.
dissenting). In a separate dissent, Chief Justice William Rehnquist also found an interstate sover-
eign immunity but seemed to rely more on the Eleventh Amendment and the reasoning of Hans
than on more general principles of structural federalism. Id. at 432-43 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
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According to Hans, because the Eleventh Amendment purports to
protect a state's sovereignty recognized by the common law, it is
important to attempt a working definition of that concept. The
Court has often used the word sovereignty, but it has never explic-
itly defined it. Justice Joseph Story, in his work Constitution, de-
fined sovereignty as "the union and exercise of all human power pos-
sessed in a state; it is the power to do everything in a state without
accountability."60 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, attempting to jus-
tify sovereign immunity, defined a sovereign as one who has the
power to promulgate positive law.6' While many scholars question
whether sovereignty is a relevant concept in a system where individ-
uals can peacefully alter the government they created, 62 they seem
to agree that where the concept is used, it must be defined in its
classical liberal sense: the ability of a political entity to prescribe the
rules of order and behavior for others (laws) without having to (1)
look to higher authority as a source of power or (2) be subject to the
oversight of that higher authority. 63 Certainly the federal govern-
ment possesses these characteristics; at least that much can be reck-
oned from Chisholm. Hans, however, held that the states possess
these attributes as well,64 despite the "solecism of imperium in im-
perio."' 5 If states are "sovereign" despite the authority of the fed-
eral government, why are local political subdivisions - which, after
all, exercise state political authority - not equally sovereign and
60. JAMES MARSHALL. SWORDS AND SYMBOLS: THE TECHNIQUE OF SOVEREIGNTY 5 (1969)
(quoting Justice Story).
61. "A sovereign is exempt from suit ... on the . . . ground that there can be no legal right as
against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends." Kawananakoa v.
Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907) (emphasis added).
62. See generally F.H. HINSLEY, SOVEREIGNTY (1966); Amar, supra note 43, at 1430-55 (argu-
ing that Americans redefined the locus of sovereignty from the "King-in-Parliament" to the peo-
ple): Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism After
Garcia, 1985 Sup. CT. REV. 341, 346-59 [hereinafter Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process]
(agreeing with Amar that sovereignty, as the Framers understood that term, rested with the peo-
ple rather than with any government, but also arguing that "sovereignty [is] of questionable value
both as an analytical tool and as a norm defining a desirable feature of political organization");
Yves R. Simon, Sovereignty in Democracy, in IN DEFENSE OF SOVEREIGNTY 241 (W. Stanjeiwicz
ed., 1969) (suggesting that while the people possess ultimate sovereignty in a democratic state, the
government is sovereign under a "coach-driver" theory; i.e., the government drives the coach and
thus appears to be in control of its destination but in reality is driving the "coach" only in accor-
dance with the peoples' instructions).
63. Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process, supra note 62, at 347-48. See also Jacques
Maritian, The Philosophic Attack, in IN DEFENSE OF SOVEREIGNTY 41 (W. Stanjeiwicz ed.,
1969) (stating that "[s]overeignty equals full autonomy or right to decide without appeal").
64. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 16 (1890).
65. Amar, supra note 43, at 1436.
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thus entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amend-
ment? This was the essential question posed by Lincoln County in
1890.
The simple answer, of course, is that these entities are not the
state. Historically, most governance functions were exercised by the
state, not by local political subdivisions. During the very early days
of the Republic, most cities were more concerned with managing
their properties than with exercising regulatory or taxing power for
the general welfare.66 This was not lost on the Justices who decided
Chisholm. Chief Justice Jay, in supporting his argument that the
states possessed no sovereign immunity under Article III, analogized
the status of the state to that of its local political subdivisions: "In
this city [Philadelphia], there are forty odd thousand free citizens,
all of whom may be collectively sued by any individual citizen. In
the State of Delaware, there are fifty odd thousand free citizens,
and what reason can be assigned why a free citizen who has de-
mands against them should not prosecute them?"6 " Justice Iredell,
the lone dissenter in Chisholm and whose opinion most informed the
result in Hans, specifically distinguished the state from local politi-
cal subdivisions: "[A s]tate cannot be considered upon the same
footing as the municipal corporations I have been considering
... ," While neither Justice explained his reasons, it was evident
that the general understanding at the time was that local political
subdivisions were just a variety of corporations which owed their
existence to a charter granted by the "sovereign"; that is, the state.
Thus, in terms of sovereignty, political subdivisions did not resemble
the state. Unlike the states themselves, these political subdivisions
were beholden to a higher governmental authority for their power
and accountable to that higher governmental authority for its exer-
cise.69 In fact, the distinction which the Supreme Court drew be-
tween private and public corporations in Trustees of Dartmouth
College v. Woodward"° removed any independent raison d'etre from
66. See HENDRIC HARTOG. PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER: THE CORPORATION OF
THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN AMERICAN LAW. 1730-1870, at 192-204 (1983) (discussing the for-
mulation of the corporation of the City of New York).
67. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 472 (1793).
68. Id. at 448 (Iredell, J., dissenting).
69. Cf. Briffault, Part I, supra note 16, at 93 n.385 ("In the absence of a specific congressional
grant of immunity, the most local governments can aspire to is autonomy, not sovereignty.").
70. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819) (using the Contracts Clause to hold that the state of New
Hampshire could not force Dartmouth College to become a public institution in contravention of
its charter).
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a municipal corporation, making it even less "sovereign" than a pri-
vate corporation."1
This perception of local political subdivisions as mere chartered
corporations remained largely unchanged during the nineteenth cen-
tury. When Lincoln County was decided in 1890, the legal relation-
ship between a state and its political subdivisions was that of subser-
vience by the latter to the former. The predominate view of local
political subdivisions was embodied in "Dillon's Rule," which stated
that municipal corporations possessed only those powers expressly
delegated to them by the state and could exercise only those author-
ities which were absolutely necessary to effectuate those powers.72
In the same year that the Court decided Hans and Lincoln County,
the fourth edition of John Dillon's treatise reasserted the sovereignty
of the state and the subservience of its local governmental units.
Dillon stated that "the power of the legislature over [municipal cor-
porations] is supreme and transcendent: it may .. .erect, change,
divide, and even abolish them, at pleasure, as it deems the public
good to require.
71. See Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1099-1109,
1120-49 (1980) [hereinafter Frug, The City] (describing the public/private distinction as it is
applied in the context of state/local relations and powerfully attacking the persistence of that
distinction). See generally HARTOG, supra note 66, at 192 ("The trick was to divide entities that
derived power from the state from those that held rights against the state.").
72. 1 JOHN F. DILLON. COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 89, at
145 (Boston, Little Brown) (4th ed. 1890). This view was not universal during that time period.
See THOMAS M, COOLEY. A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON
THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION (8th ed. 1927) (suggesting
that an inherent right of local self-government exists independently of the state and its desires).
The Michigan Supreme Court recognized an inherent right of local self-government in People ex
rel LeRoy v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44 (1871). While it has never been explicitly overruled, the prin-
ciple of local self-government is no longer itself a limitation on state power but is used in inter-
preting ambiguous constitutional provisions. See Brouwer v. Kent County Clerk, 377 Mich. 616,
651-52 (1966) (discussing local government authority in relation to the state constitution); see
also Joan C. Williams, The Constitutional Vulnerability of American Local Government: The
Politics of City Status in American Law, 1986 Wisc. L. REV. 83 (analyzing differences in the
theories, backgrounds, and motivations between Judge Dillon and Professor Cooley). See gener-
ally Howard L. McBain, The Doctrine of an Inherent Right of Self-Government, 16 COLUM. L.
REV. 190 (1916) (describing the extent to which courts apply the doctrine of an inherent right of
local self-government).
73. DILLON, supra note 72, at 93. See also HOWARD S. ABBOTT, A SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF
PUBLIC CORPORATIONS 49 (1908) (stating that public corporations are subject to the will of the
state); I CHARLES F. BEACH. JR., COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF PUBLIC CORPORATIONS, IN-
CLUDING MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS AND POLITICAL OR GOVERNMENTAL CORPORATIONS OF
EVERY CLASS § 538, at 549 (Indianapolis, Bowen-Merrill 1893) (asserting that public corpora-
tions are "mere instrumentalities" of the state). One might argue that my definition of sovereignty
is too crabbed and that it assumes a "sovereign" must have the whole "bundle of sticks" or none
at all. Indeed, the definition I have used virtually ensures that local governments cannot qualify as
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Not possessing the major attribute of sovereignty, that of inde-
pendent lawmaking authority, local political subdivisions generally
did not possess sovereign immunity either, unless the statute or state
charter which created them could be interpreted as conferring that
immunity.7 The only recognized exception was when a local politi-
cal subdivision was engaged in an activity because the state had im-
posed on it a duty or obligation to perform that activity; only then
would the common law recognize a sufficient identity with the state
to permit the state's sovereign immunity to attach to the local
unit.7 5 Far from being an anomaly, then, Lincoln County follows
logically from the Court's conclusion in Hans that the Eleventh
Amendment constitutionalized one of the major attributes of sover-
eignty recognized by the common law: sovereign immunity.7 6
That Lincoln County may have been perfectly consistent with
Hans when it was decided does not, of course, justify the Court's
continued adherence to it. Our changing views of local political sub-
divisions, the expansion of their functions, the changes in the legal
status of some local governmental units brought about by a variety
of home rule powers and other immunities from state control, the
growth and development of constitutional values of federalism be-
yond parochial notions of sovereignty, and the strength and persis-
tence of critical commentary of Hans require yet another look at
Lincoln County. The next section analyzes the arguments support-
ing Eleventh Amendment protection for local political subdivisions.
sovereigns. Home rule provisions may make that argument plausible today, but it was not so when
Lincoln County was decided. See infra notes 94-128 and accompanying text (discussing the legal
structure of political subdivisions). Whatever definition of sovereignty one might use, it at least
must include the right of independent existence. Local governments did not have that attribute in
1890 in any but a handful of jurisdictions.
74. 2 DILLON, supra note 72, §§ 935-89, at 1139-1217.
75. Id. § 949, at 1157-58; ABBOTT, supra note 73, at 529.
76. Professor Cass Sunstein has argued that it was characteristic of the "era" in which Hans
was decided for the Court to constitutionalize the common law. Cass Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy,
87 COLUM. L. REv. 873, 874 (1987) [hereinafter Sunstein, Legacy]. The cases in which this oc-
curred were largely substantive due process cases, and the common law of property and contract
was used as a "baseline" for constitutional adjudication. Id. While neither Hans nor Lincoln
County raised precisely that issue, their method of analysis seems identical.
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II. TEXTUAL ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF PROTECTING POLITICAL
SUBDIVISIONS
A. The Meaning of "State"
The first two arguments in favor of allowing Eleventh Amend-
ment protection to local political subdivisions start with the text and
structural assumptions of the Constitution. The first argument is
classically textual. It asserts that since the word "state," as it ap-
pears in other parts of the Constitution, includes political subdivi-
sions, this same meaning should attach when it is used in the Elev-
enth Amendment. This is based on the more or less universal rule of
interpretation that a word used several times in the same document
should be given the same meaning each time it is used."
It is true that "state" is most often interpreted to include political
subdivisions. The double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment, 78
the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment,79 the Fifteenth Amendment,"0 the three subsections of
Article I, section 10,81 and, by way of judicial interpretation, the
dormant side of the Commerce Clause82 all give "state" such a
meaning. There are, however, two difficulties with this textual argu-
ment. First, and most significantly, when the word "state" is used in
Article III, section 2, it cannot be interpreted to include political
subdivisions.8" The Eleventh Amendment was designed to and did
77. HENRY C. BLACK. INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS § 53, at 145 (2d ed. 1911). See Adam-
son v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 63 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (stating that the term "due
process," which appears in both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, compels a meaning of due
process independent of the first eight amendments); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158
(1973) (holding that since the word "person" can have only a post-natal meaning in other provi-
sions of the Constitution, it must have that meaning in section I of the Fourteenth Amendment as
well).
78. See Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387 (1970) (holding that a conviction by both a state and
its municipality for the same crime violates the double jeopardy provision of the Fifth
Amendment).
79. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980) (holding that the word "state" in
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment includes political subdivisions); Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (interpreting "state" in the Equal Protection Clause as
including political subdivisions).
80. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (holding that a city election process violated
the Fifteenth Amendment).
81. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
82. Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) (holding that a city milk regula-
tion violated the dormant Commerce Clause).
83. Both paragraphs one and two of that section refer to "states." Obviously, Article Ill does
not contemplate that the Supreme Court should exercise original jurisdiction in a dispute between
the City of Philadelphia and the King of Prussia. Nor does diversity jurisdiction exist when a
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correct a perceived misreading of that provision. It would at best be
counter-intuitive to suggest that the word "state" should have a
broader meaning in the corrective amendment than it does in the
subsequently corrected text.
Second, the analogy between the Eleventh Amendment, which
limits federal power vis-a-vis the states, and the other provisions
where the word "state" is used, which limit state power vis-a-vis
individuals, is imperfect at best. Neither at the present time nor
during the era of Lincoln County has anyone doubted a state's abil-
ity to establish local political subdivisions and to delegate to those
local units the coercive powers of regulation and taxation, powers
which most often implicate individual liberties. It would hardly be
plausible to interpret the word "state" to exclude state-created polit-
ical subdivisions when individual liberties are at stake. To do so
would be tantamount to giving a state the option to suspend feder-
ally guaranteed rights through the use of their admitted power to
delegate police, taxing, and service distribution powers to local gov-
ernmental units.84 This does not necessarily mean, however, that a
local political subdivision must also be treated the same as a state
for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment, where individual liberties
are not implicated.
B. The Text of the Tenth Amendment
A stronger textual argument narrows the focus to the language
and purpose of the Tenth Amendment:85 If the word "state" as used
in the Tenth Amendment includes political subdivisions, the same
interpretation must be given to "state" in the Eleventh Amendment.
This argument is not simply repetitious of the first, for this argu-
ment relies on the similarity of purpose of the Tenth and Eleventh
Amendments, rather than simply on the similarity of their language.
For several reasons, however, this argument is also unappealing,
even assuming the Court has decided that whatever immunity from
federal legislative actions the Tenth Amendment confers on states
resident of the city of Cleveland sues a resident of Shaker Heights, a suburb of Cleveland.
84. Cf. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (striking down as a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause a charter amendment requiring voter approval of all ordinances regulating real
estate transfers on the basis of race, religion, or national origin).
85. The Tenth Amendment states: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Con-
stitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." U.S. CONSr. amend. X.
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are also applicable to local political subdivisions.8 6
First, this argument assumes that the Eleventh Amendment was
enacted because of a constitutional misunderstanding about the rel-
ative authority of the federal government and the states. While this
reading of the Eleventh Amendment seems to be the present posi-
tion of at least a plurality of the Court,8 7 it is by no means univer-
sally accepted.8 8 More importantly, it is not clear that one can
equate Tenth and Eleventh Amendment conceptions of sovereignty.
Simply put, the difference between the Tenth and Eleventh Amend-
ments is the difference between restricting Congress's Article I pow-
ers and restricting the federal judiciary's Article III powers. 89 Ad-
mittedly, both Congress and the federal judiciary can pose a threat
to state autonomy, but the threats differ.
The Tenth Amendment is concerned with the locus of "substan-
tive" decisional authority - with which level of government makes
the rules to resolve disputes or compromise competing viewpoints or
philosophies. If the essential question posed by the Tenth Amend-
ment is whether the state or the federal government's policies will
resolve a particular dispute, it simply does not make sense to inter-
pret the word "state" in the Tenth Amendment to exclude political
subdivisions. To do so would provide no constitutional protection to
a state which, as they all do, finds it more efficient to delegate gov-
86. The Court did so explicitly in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 855 n.20
(1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). The
National League footnote was hardly necessary, however, to reach this result. Although twenty-
two states were among the appellants, only four local political subdivisions could be included in
that lot. National League, 426 U.S. at 836-37 n.7. The Court held that the existence of the
governmental appellants relieved the Court of having to determine the standing of the organiza-
tional appellants. Id. By the same reasoning, the fact that twenty-two of the appellants were states
made the reference to local political subdivisions unnecessary. Cf City of Lafayette v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 412-13 n.42 (1978) (holding that National League does not
provide a basis for an implied constitutional deference to cities).
87. Welsh v. State Dept. of Highways & Pub. Trans., 483 U.S. 468, 479-80 (1987). See also
Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 229 n.2 (1989) (declining to overrule Hans).
88. See supra note 43 (citing examples of several authors who do not agree with this reading of
the Eleventh Amendment). Cf George D. Brown, State Sovereignty Under the Burger Court -
How the Eleventh Amendment Survived the Death of the Tenth: Some Broader Implications of
Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 74 GEO. L. J. 363 (1985) [hereinafter Brown, State Sover-
eignty] (stating that the Eleventh Amendment, like the Garcia Court's reading of the Tenth,
provides "procedural" protection from Congressional attempts to override state autonomy).
89. TRIBE. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. supra note 59, at 185 (distinguishing between "substantive
law making competence" - the concern of Article I and the Tenth Amendment - "and the
federal judicial power" - the concern of Article II and the Eleventh Amendment). But see
REDISH, supra note 43, at 150-51 (stating that the Eleventh Amendment's language also serves to
limit Congress's power to establish federal courts, thus rendering Tribe's distinctions illogical).
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erning authority to local units than to exercise all its state authority
directly. Moreover, even if the word "state" in the Tenth Amend-
ment were literally interpreted to mean only the state, one would
still have to contend with the Amendment's last phrase, "or to the
people."9 Whatever substantive import the Tenth Amendment ei-
ther does or was intended to have, it is clear from that phrase that,
subject to "specific" limitations, the Constitution explicitly leaves to
the states the determination of how their governing authority is to
be distributed."
The Eleventh Amendment, on the other hand, does not prevent
the federal judiciary from displacing the states' policy-making au-
thority; it only removes a federal judicial forum when the plaintiff is
an individual and the defendant is a state.92 The Eleventh Amend-
ment therefore protects the states from a different threat than does
the Tenth Amendment: it prohibits the symbolic affront to state sov-
ereignty which would occur if a state were forced to defend its ac-
tions in a "foreign" forum against its wishes. The Eleventh Amend-
ment is more concerned with concepts of sovereignty than with the
broader concerns of autonomy which underscore the Tenth Amend-
ment.93 Consequently, interpreting the word "state" in the Eleventh
Amendment to exclude political subdivisions does not necessarily
have the same effect as would a similar interpretation of the same
word in the Tenth Amendment. If Lincoln County is to be reconsid-
ered, then it must be for reasons other than a strict reading of con-
stitutional text.
90. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
91. See Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 652 (1948) ("The principle of 'Home Rule' was an
axiom among the authors of the Constitution.").
92. The Eleventh Amendment only prohibits the exercise of federal judicial authority; state
courts may still be open to hear whatever claim the plaintiff may have asked the federal court to
hear. Whether they may be required to hear such claims is not altogether clear despite Testa v.
Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947) (holding that a state is not free to refuse enforcement of a federal
law). See, e.g., Brown, State Sovereignty, supra note 88, at 391-93 (stating that whether a state
court must hear all federal claims remains an open question). The distinction between who makes
the policy and the forum in which that policy is applied was somewhat fuzzy before the Court
decided, in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), that federal courts could no longer
apply federal common law when diversity of citizenship was the only basis of federal jurisdiction.
Now, however, state substantive rules of decision apply despite the federal forum. See Pennhurst
State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment
bars a pendent state law claim even though a federal court would have to apply state law when
adjudicating that claim).
93. See infra notes 129-216 and accompanying text (discussing the more general principles of
autonomy which concern the functions local political subdivisions perform and their fiscal ability
to engage in those functions).
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C. The Eleventh Amendment, Sovereignty, and The Legal
Structure of Political Subdivisions
It is fair to say that if Dillon's Rule 4 is not dead, it no longer
typifies the relationship between a state and its most important po-
litical subdivisions. Well over half of the states have conferred some
form of home rule authority on at least the most populous of their
general purpose units of local governments.95 In addition, most
states are prohibited from enacting so-called local legislation; 96 if
the state is going to legislate with respect to "local concerns," it
must do so via generally applicable legislation. A few states prohibit
their administrative agencies from subverting a local government's
policies without some clear overriding state interest.9 7 Other juris-
dictions prohibit the state from taxing local residents for local pur-
poses, reserving that authority to local governments.98 New Jersey
constitutionally abolished Dillon's Rule and substituted a rule of
construction requiring broad interpretation of local governmental
authority.9 9 Other states accomplished the same result by judicial
fiat. 100 In short, whereas Dillon's Rule pronounced the locus of all
decisional authority to be at the state level, these more recent devel-
opments, to one degree or another, have shifted that decisional locus
to local governments. Once the legal structure empowers local gov-
ernments with "final" decisional authority with respect to local mat-
ters, they are, to that extent, "sovereign." And as sovereigns, they
should be accorded the same Eleventh Amendment immunity as
other sovereigns. This could be accomplished without in any way
doing violence to the Court's existing Eleventh Amendment juris-
prudence by simply redefining "state" in terms of the Eleventh
Amendment to include all those local units of government which
possess the necessary attributes of sovereignty. Indeed, it would
bring Eleventh Amendment doctrine in line with the Court's origi-
nal rationale in Hans and Lincoln County.
94. See supra note 72 and accompanying text (describing Dillon's Rule).
95. CHESTER J. ANTIEAU. LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 3, at 3-3 to -6 (1992).
96. GERALD E. FRUG, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 191 (1988); e.g., ALA. CONST. art. IV,
§ 104; MINN. CONST. art. XII, §§ 1-3; MONT. CONST. art. V, § 12.
97. E.g., COLO. CONST. art. V, § 35; PENN. CONST. art. IIl, § 31.
98. E.g., ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6.
99. N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7.
100. See State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116, 1121 (Utah 1980) (holding that it is inappropri-
ate for the court to inhibit the power of local governments through strict construction of delegated
powers).
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Unfortunately, the argument based on the sovereignty of local po-
litical subdivisions has significant limitations, both quantitative and
qualitative. Quantitatively, both the number of jurisdictions in
which political subdivisions can fairly be characterized as sovereign
and the number of "sovereign" political subdivisions actually in
those states are relatively few. There are a number of non-home rule
states where the powers of local political subdivisions are still de-
fined by Dillon's Rule.1"1 Political subdivisions in these states are
not protected under the Eleventh Amendment because, having no
claim to sovereignty, they are not state equivalents in terms of the
sovereignty underpinnings of the Eleventh Amendment.
The same can be said of any political subdivision which possesses
home rule powers by reason of a state legislative grant, whether or
not that home rule grant depends on a constitutional provision.'0 2
What the legislature gives it can take away, either in whole or in
part and subject to whatever conditions it chooses to impose, so long
as other constitutional provisions are not violated. These political
subdivisions thus do not possess either criterion for a claim of law-
making sovereignty. The source of their power to make "law" rests
with another political body, and even when that power has been lib-
erally granted, it is subject to limitation by the grantor. There re-
main those states which constitutionally confer home rule authority
on their local political subdivisions without the need for discretion-
ary legislative action (states in which the home rule provision is self-
executing),0 8 or where the home rule provision requires the legisla-
ture to confer home rule authority on local subdivisions.0 4 But even
in those states, a pure sovereignty argument requires some addi-
tional inquiries, the most prominent of which is whether the consti-
tutional provision, despite its self-executing or mandatory nature, re-
quires or permits the state legislature to approve a city's charter or
any amendments to that charter. 05
Finally, even in those jurisdictions in which local political subdivi-
sions are constitutionally granted self-governing powers without dis-
cretionary legislative oversight, the number of local units actually
given that authority is likely to be relatively small. Most political
101. E.g., GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2; IND. CONST. art. IV, § 10; VA. CONST. art. VII, § 2.
102. See MICH. CONST. art. Vii, § 2 (stating that all county authority is derived through law).
103. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 8; COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6; OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 3, 7.
104. E.g., N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 2.
105. OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS. JR.. LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 36, at 99 n.8 (1982).
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subdivisions are not given home rule powers; they are either dele-
gate state agencies, such as counties or towns (often called town-
ships in states west of the Hudson River), or single-purpose units of
local government such as school boards, sanitary and water districts,
housing authorities, and the like. With the exception of some limited
home rule authority which some states confer on counties, 106 these
local units are still largely governed by Dillon's Rule or its
equivalent. Moreover, some states require that general purpose units
of local government, excluding most villages and even some smaller
cities, meet a minimum population requirement before they can ex-
ercise home rule powers. 10 7 Other states require that a city adopt a
charter, the functional equivalent of a constitution for the local gov-
ernment." 8 While this seems to be of little or no hindrance to
achieving sovereign status, cities which for one reason or another
decide to remain statutory cities cannot claim the sovereign status
which Hans and Lincoln County seem to demand.
In addition to the quantitative limit on potential Eleventh
Amendment sovereignty for local political subdivisions, there is a
qualitative limit as well. Not all constitutional home rule provisions
establish local governmental units as being independent of the state.
While a bit oversimplified, there are essentially two constitutional
home rule models: the imperio model,' 0 9 and what may be called,
for want of a better description, the "Fordham" model." 0 Both have
the common feature of granting local home rule units the power to
106. E.g., OHIO CONST. art. X, § 3; PENN. CONST. art. IX, § 4. These home rule provisions
typically give counties no protection from preemption either by the state or by home rule munici-
palities located within their borders. There are, however, rare exceptions. See FLA. CONST. art.
VIII, § 6 (creating Metropolitan Dade County and giving that county preemptive powers over
home rule municipalities with respect to certain county-wide matters).
107. REYNOLDS, supra note 105, at 98.
108. E.g., OHIO CONST. art. XVIlI, § 2.
109. The imperio model, short for imperium in imperio ("state within a state"), is characteris-
tic of some of the earlier home rule provisions such as California's, (CALIF. CONST. art. X1, § 5),
Missouri's (Mo. CONST. art. VI, § 19), and Ohio's (OHIO CONST. art. XVIII, § 3). Also, it is
suggestive of two "sovereignties:" the state and the home rule unit. The textual phrase which
defines both the home rule government's scope of initiative and the limits of the state's preemptive
authority is "municipal affairs," or in Ohio, the "powers of local self-government."
110. The Fordham model was drafted in 1952 by Dean Jefferson Fordham and sponsored by
the American Municipal Association. This model does not limit a home rule government's initia-
tive authority to "local or municipal affairs," or "powers of local self-government." For a general
description of the Fordham model, see JEFFERSON B. FORDHAM. LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAw 77-87
(2d ed. 1986). Rather, this model generally provides that a home rule government "may exercise
any power or perform any function which the legislature has power to [delegate] . E.g.,
MASS. CONST. amend. art. 2, § 6.
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initiate legislation without first seeking authority from the state leg-
islature. The difference textually, if not in practice,"' is that the
scope of local initiative in the former is limited to matters of "local
concern," while it is typical of provisions of the latter type to grant
local legislative initiative over a wide spectrum of state legislative
authority, subject to the unlimited preemptive power of the state.
Since Hans and Lincoln County were decided at a time when the
federal structure was viewed as one of dual sovereignties," 2 and
since both have survived a shift in the Court's perception to one of a
federal system of overlapping powers,1 13 both the Fordham model
and the imperio model would be consistent with a sovereignty
theory.
The same is true when the inquiry moves from legislative initia-
tive to legislative autonomy, defined for sovereignty purposes as the
ability to promulgate policy without having to account to the revi-
sionary power of a higher authority. Indeed, the autonomy'which
local home rule governments derive from their states under both
models approximates that which the states enjoy from the federal
government. Like all systems premised on dual sovereignty, the im-
perio model cordons off an area of local concern immune from state
legislative interference, much as the Supreme Court in New York v.
I11. Briffault, Part I, supra note 16, at 15; see Terrance Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal
Power Under Home Rule: A Role for the Courts, 48 MINN. L. REv. 643, 663 (1964) ("[W]ith the
possible exception of a single state, the grant of municipal initiative in home rule provisions has
been broadly construed by the courts.").
112. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (holding that the states, not the
federal government, were entrusted with authority over local matters); United States v. E.C.
Knight Co., 156 U.S. I (1895) (stating that the act of refining sugar is local and therefore not
commerce, despite the fact that the sugar was later shipped out of state). Dual federalism has
judicial roots which date back to Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). Although
Gibbons was ultimately decided on Supremacy Clause grounds, Chief Justice Marshall neverthe-
less took the opportunity to comment that the argument based on the exclusive power of Congress
to regulate commerce had "great force," and had not "been refuted." Id. at 209. Justice William
Johnson wrote a concurring opinion which rested on a constitutional theory of mutually exclusive
powers. Id. at 222-39 (Johnson, J., concurring).
113. A "clean break" with the concept of dual federalism occurred in United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100 (1941), when the Court described the Tenth Amendment, which to the Hammer
Court was the textual embodiment of dual federalism, as a "truism." Id. at 124. That our consti-
tutional structure contemplates overlapping rather than exclusive powers is also evident in the so-
called "dormant Commerce Clause" cases. These cases recognize that states have the authority to
regulate matters which, because of their close connection to interstate commerce, Congress could
also regulate if it chose to do so. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117
(1978) (upholding a state regulation prohibiting oil refiners from owning retail gasoline outlets
despite the fact that the interstate effects would undoubtedly justify federal regulation); South
Carolina St. Hwy. Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938) (upholding a state regulation
limiting the size of trucks on state highways).
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United States 14 cordoned off an area of state concern immune from
federal interference under the Tenth Amendment. It is true that
under the Fordham model, a state legislature has the power to pre-
empt local legislative decisions of any nature as well as the ability to
prohibit the exercise of local authority in any area it wishes. 1 5
However, when one looks to state autonomy in the federal system
for guidance, the distinction between the two models may be more
apparent than real. The judicial standards for determining when
preemption occurs, an issue decided far more frequently than the
constitutional issue of legislative power, are nearly identical. Both at
the federal/state level and at the state/local level, preemption is not
lightly presumed. Only if the two enactments cannot coexist will a
court declare that one has been displaced by the other."1 6 At both
the federal and state levels, this approach is informed, if not de-
manded, by similar principles of federalism." 7
There are two wrinkles, however. First, under neither home rule
model is it permissible for a local political subdivision to enact "pri-
vate law." Despite the unlimited textual delegation in the "Ford-
ham" model, it has never been interpreted to include the power to
promulgate the basic rules of contract, tort, or property. The result
is the same in imperio model jurisdictions; private law is not consid-
ered a matter of "local concern."" 8 How then can a local home rule
unit claim it is "sovereign" if it has no authority, absent state au-
thorization, to determine the basic civil rules of behavior? It is
114. 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992) (striking down the "take-title" provision of the Low-Level Radio-
active Waste Policy Amendment Act as an infringement of state sovereignty under the Tenth
Amendment); see also National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. at 833, 845, 851 (1976)
(holding that Congress may not regulate in a manner that impinges on the states' decision-making
authority over its governmental functions), overruled by Garcia v, San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
115. Frank P. Grad, The State's Capacity to Respond to Urban Problems, in THE STATES AND
THE URBAN CRISIS 49 (Alan K. Campbell ed., 1970), cited in WILLIAM D. VALENTE & DAVID J.
MCCARTHY. JR.. LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 112 (4th ed. 1992).
116. See Evanston v. Create, Inc., 421 N.E.2d 196 (III. 1981) (refusing to find that a city
landlord was preempted by state law); Massie v. Brown, 527 P.2d 476 (Wash. 1974) (holding that
a municipality may be enjoined from extending civil service status to warrant servers when the
state asserts a paramount interest).
117. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, Ill S. Ct. 2395 (1991) (refusing to upset the balance between
federal and state powers absent an express congressional mandate); United States v. Bass, 404
U.S. 336 (1971) (stating that American federalism gives rise to Congress's reluctance to disturb
federal and state relations); State ex rel Haley v. Troutdale, 576 P.2d 1238 (Ore. 1978) (holding
that more stringent local building codes were not incompatible with state standards).
118. See generally Gary T. Schwartz, The Logic of Home Rule and The Private Law Excep-
tion, 20 U.C.LA. L. REV. 671 (1973) (exploring the authority of a "home rule" city to establish
"private law").
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tempting to respond that "it cannot." However, if one looks to the
reasons why this is so, the analogy to state powers under the federal
system is not far off. The spill-over effects of differing standards of
commercial and noncommercial intercourse between upwards of
thirty to fifty jurisdictions within closely-confined territorial limits
would be enormous, to say the least;" 9 too enormous to reasonably
expect a state legislature to be able to cure these effects with its
preemptive authority. That is essentially the same reasoning the
Court used to assert the "need for uniformity" standard in Cooley v.
Board of Wardens,20 a standard which is now used to determine
whether congressional commercial legislation "intended" to preclude
any state regulation. 2' While Cooley imposed a more discrete limi-
tation on state lawmaking sovereignty than the total exclusion of
local governments from the arena of private lawmaking authority,
when looking for analogies, it is the rationale of the exclusion that is
determinative.
The second wrinkle is not so easy to dispose of because it argua-
bly goes to the heart of the Eleventh Amendment's concern. What
precipitated the Chisholm121 "crisis," and what has preoccupied
Eleventh Amendment litigation ever since, is a concern for the in-
tegrity of the state's fisc. Indeed, that concern is far broader than
the Eleventh Amendment; it is a concern which both historically
and currently pervades our discussion of local autonomy and self-
governance.' 23 Next to a state's power to determine its own govern-
mental structure and methods of conducting its governmental busi-
ness, a state's power to raise revenue to finance that business is the
prerogative protected by our dual system of government. At the
same time Chief Justice Marshall articulated a broad preemptive
federal power over state regulatory choices under the Necessary and
Proper Clause, he carefully circumscribed federal power when it
119. Id. at 748-50, 759.
120. 53 U.S. 299 (1851).
121. E.g., Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 639 (1973) (discussing the
disruptive effect of multiple noise control regulations).
122. See supra notes 49-71 and accompanying text (comparing the decisions in Chisholm and
Hans).
123. See Brown, State Sovereignty, supra note 88, at 373, 391 (discussing the importance of
state authority over its own treasury); Tribe, New Federalism, supra note 13, at 1075-76 (sug-
gesting that federal control over state budgets could significantly curtail local services). See gener-
ally Frug, Power of the Purse, supra note 16 (suggesting that the Supreme Court will have to
place limits on the ever-increasing influence that local governments have over governmental
spending).
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came to a state's revenue raising authority.124 While he was willing
to concede the possibility that Congress's commerce powers were ex-
clusive, he was careful to say that Congress's taxing powers were
not.1 25
Unlike the federal/state system, which presupposes significant
state fiscal autonomy, all home rule provisions leave the state sub-
stantially in control of local finances and local financing options.
There are two approaches to taxing authority under home rule pro-
visions (including imperio home rule provisions). The most restric-
tive prohibits even local initiative on taxing options. Absent a special
constitutional provision, local political subdivisions in these jurisdic-
tions must seek state legislative approval to tax their citizens.12 6
Further, even those jurisdictions which interpret their home rule
provisions to allow local legislative initiative in fiscal matters liber-
ally permit state preemption of local taxing decisions. 1 7 Moreover,
most jurisdictions, whatever their position on local tax initiatives,
require state oversight of local budgets, whether to ensure that debt
limits are respected or that tax rates do not exceed prescribed lim-
its. 128 Simply put, while home rule provisions may have altered Dil-
lon's Rule assumptions about the locus of local regulatory authority,
they have altered very little, if at all, any assumptions regarding the
locus of fiscal authority. Consequently, any analogy between a
state's general autonomy from federal authority by reason of our
constitutional structure and a local government's autonomy from
state authority by reason of a home rule provision breaks down al-
most completely when one focuses on the central concern of the
Eleventh Amendment: fiscal autonomy. Other reasons, unrelated to
sovereignty, must then justify Eleventh Amendment immunity for
local political subdivisions.
III. ARGUMENTS FROM FUNCTION
A. The Functions Performed by Political Subdivisions
There was a time when it was easy to functionally distinguish be-
124. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 425-30 (1819).
125. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 190-200 (1824).
126. FRANK 1. MICHELMAN & TERRANCE SANDALOW, MATERIALS ON GOVERNMENT IN URBAN
AREAS 422-47 (1970); REYNOLDS, supra note 105, § 40, at 110-12; Frug, The City, supra note
71, at 1057, 1064.
127. REYNOLDS, supra note 105, § 40, at 110-12.
128. E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 705.15 (Baldwin 1990).
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tween a state and its local governments, particularly cities - which
have the most plausible claim for Eleventh Amendment protection.
The state was responsible for most governance functions as we now
know them, including the raising of whatever revenue was needed
through mandatory exactions. Local subdivisions possessed few pow-
ers of governance except those that were incident to the manage-
ment of their own properties. Most municipal services were either
individually purchased or provided cooperatively,129 much like a pre-
sent-day homeowner's association.'
That is certainly not true today. If one looks at the functions of
the modern city, they are hardly different from those of the state.
Actually, it is more than that. As Professor Richard Briffault dem-
onstrates, in a number of important areas local governmental units
have largely displaced the state as the primary governing and ser-
vice-providing unit.13 1 Cities and other general purpose political sub-
divisions legislate in a wide area of their citizens' economic and so-
cial activities, from traffic regulation to weights and measures
requirements for merchants, from comprehensive criminal codes to
land use regulations and property management codes, and every-
thing in between. They enforce their will with their own police
forces, often in their own courts. Moreover, many of these political
units have assumed responsibility for some of the most pressing so-
cial service needs of the day. Some cities own and manage hospitals,
run drug control programs, and provide housing for low income per-
sons, while paying for many of these services by redistributive taxes
assessed on residents and nonresidents alike. Even those entities that
do not possess the comprehensive powers of the urban city perform a
variety of functions which the state either had performed or would
be performing were it not for these local political entities.13 2
129. HARTOG, supra note 66, at 36 ("When government activity was needed, . . . (citizens]
looked not to the corporation but to statutory authorities established by the provincial legislature
to take charge of the vital affairs of the community. Or they looked to voluntary associations such
as fire companies and libraries.").
130. See generally Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 1519 (1982) (describing the role of homeowners' associations and their possible inclusion in
public governance); Uriel Reichman, Residential Private Governments: An Introductory Survey,
43 U. CHI. L. REv. 253 (1976) (analyzing homeowners' associations as residential private
governments).
131. Briffault, Part 11, supra note 16, at 354, 382.
132. The most notable example is education. Most state constitutions require the state to per-
form educational functions, but most have delegated this function to local political subdivisions:
either general purpose units like cities or independently-elected school boards. E.g., N.Y. CONST.
art. XI; PA. CONST. art. III, § 14; TEXAS CONST. art. VII, § I.
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Why then should Eleventh Amendment immunity focus on
archaic definitions of sovereignty and outmoded understandings of
local governmental functions? If these local political subdivisions
are doing the states' business, why should they not receive the
states' Eleventh Amendment immunities? The argument that they
should receive immunity is particularly appealing if one views the
Eleventh Amendment in the larger context of preserving federal-
ism/local autonomy values, rather than simply as an isolated at-
tempt to constitutionalize common law sovereign immunity. 133 Un-
fortunately, this position would necessitate a fairly detailed, case-by-
case functional analysis, and such ad hoc functional analysis has not
fared well under either the Tenth or Eleventh Amendments. Garcia
v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority13  rejected the
functional analysis of National League'35 as both unworkable and
inconsistent with federalism values. 36 While New York v. United
States137 may have employed a functional analysis, it seems limited
to prohibiting the federal government from conscripting states into a
federal regulatory army.138
Functional analyses have had little staying power under the Elev-
enth Amendment as well, although the Court has toyed more explic-
133. See Brown, State Sovereignty, supra note 88, at 363 (suggesting that viewing the Elev-
enth Amendment as "an embodiment of state sovereignty principles" is the best way to justify the
case law the amendment has generated) (emphasis added); Melvyn R. Durchslag, Welfare Litiga-
tion, the Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereignty: Some Reflections on Dandridge v. Wil-
liams, 26 CASE W. REs. L. REV, 60, 62-75 (discussing the history of the Eleventh Amendment and
its policies of preserving state sovereignty and maintaining the federal system); Massey, supra
note 43 (discussing conflicting interpretations of the Eleventh Amendment).
134. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
135. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia, 469 U.S.
528 (1985).
136. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 531; TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 59, § 5-22, at 390-97.
It is hard to generalize about the utility of functional analyses to constitutional adjudication. For
example, such an analysis was critical to some determinations of whether a private person could
be treated as the state for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Evans v. Newton, 382
U.S. 296 (1966) (private park); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (company-owned
towns); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (political party). But cf. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424
U.S. 507 (1976) (overruling the decision in Amalgamated Food Employees Local 590 v. Logan
Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968), but apparently not the public function reasoning which under-
lay the Amalgamated decision). Moreover, functional analysis ala National League seemed to be
employed by the Court in Gregory v. Ashcroft, III S. Ct. 2395, 2400 (1991), to determine
whether mandatory retirement for state judges was permissible under the Federal Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act.
137. 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
138. Id. at 2430-31; F.E.R.C. v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 775-97 (1982) (O'Connor, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
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itly with the idea. In Parden v. Terminal Railway,139 the Court held
that the state of Alabama could be sued under the Federal Employ-
ers Liability Act ("FELA")"4 O for injuries sustained by a worker
employed by a state-owned railroad. The Court reasoned that (1)
because the state had engaged in an activity (operating a railroad)
generally engaged in by private persons, and (2) because that activ-
ity was pervasively regulated by Congress under its commerce pow-
ers, the state constructively consented to being treated similar to
other private persons with respect to FELA. 141 Some nine years
later, in Employees v. Department of Public Health and Welfare,142
the Court employed the Parden reasoning when it suggested that
the latter case was distinguishable because of the "proprietary" na-
ture of operating a railroad. However, one year later, in Edelman v.
Jordan,43 the Court began to abandon the functional approach for
determining waiver of sovereign immunity in favor of the more cer-
tain "congressional clear statement" rule.14 4 Parden was finally ex-
pressly overruled seven years ago in Welch v. Texas Department of
Highways and Public Transportation.45
Admittedly, the Court has paid lip service to function as being
one element in determining whether certain "out of the ordinary"
governmental bodies are political subdivisions or arms of the
state.14 However, this limited use of a functional analysis is a far
cry from its more general use as the determinative test of local gov-
ernmental immunity. At the very least, a functional analysis inevita-
bly entails the kind of judicial balancing that the Court made a con-
139. 377 U.S. 184 (1964), overruled by Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp.,
483 U.S. 468 (1987).
140. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
141. Parden, 377 U.S. at 187-93.
142. 411 U.S. 279, 284 (1973).
143. 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (holding that a state's participation in a federally-subsidized welfare
benefits program was not dispositive of that state's consent to be sued in federal court).
144. Id. at 674. The "clear statement" rule was reasserted with unmistakable vigor in Atas-
cadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985), when the Court held that the remedy
provided in Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794a (a)(2) (1988), was insuffi-
cient to waive a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 246-47. The
language of the remedy applied "to any person aggrieved by any act . . . by any recipient of
Federal assistance." 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2) (1988). The Eleventh Amendment "clear statement"
rule may now be a general requirement whenever Congress legislates with respect to areas which
are traditionally regulated by the states. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 11l S. Ct. 2395, 2401 (1991).
145. 483 U.S. 468 (1987) (holding that an employee of the state could not sue the state in
federal court under the Jones Act).
146. Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 401-03
(1979).
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scious effort to avoid in cases such as Welsh, Atascadero, Garcia,
and New York.' 47 At its worst, a functional analysis will produce
the same confused and irreconcilable set of cases that now exists
when courts try to determine whether or not a particular govern-
mental unit, one which is not a city, is an arm of the state. 48
To avoid that confusion, every state-created entity which pos-
sesses "public" powers must be entitled to Eleventh Amendment
sovereign immunity. If the desired result is assurance that state ser-
vices will be unhampered by federal court judgments, then presuma-
bly whatever structure the state creates - or enables its local gov-
ernments to create - to administer public services ought to be
entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. That result may be
more acceptable when the beneficiary is an "ordinary" local politi-
cal subdivision such as a city, town, or school board. These are at
least political bodies which have all of the trappings (and built in
political constraints) of "the state." But what about a water storage
district which, because of its essentially private membership charac-
teristics, was held not to be "political" and thus not subject to the
Fourteenth Amendment's "one-person, one-vote" requirement? 149 Is
such an organization whose major, if not only, public characteristic
is its public bonding capacity also entitled to Eleventh Amendment
immunity simply because the state created it in order to promote a
public purpose? 150 If a state permits the formation of private, not-
for-profit organizations to undertake certain state functions such as
147. But see Stewart A. Baker, Federalism and the Eleventh Amendment, 48 U. COLO. L. REV.
139, 175 (1977) (explicitly arguing for a "balancing test" to determine the scope of state immu-
nity under the Eleventh Amendment and asserting that the strength of a state's interest be mea-
sured largely by a governmental/proprietary distinction). Baker's article was written before Gar-
cia and Welsh were handed down, however.
148. See ORTH, JUDICIAL POWER. supra note 21, at 118-20.
149. Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973); Ball v.
James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981). See generally Melvyn R. Durchslag, Salyer, Ball and Holt: Reap-
praising the Right to Vote in Terms of Political "Interest" and Vote Dilution, 33 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 1 (1982) [hereinafter Durchslag, Reappraising the Right] (criticizing the Court's analy-
ses in Salyer, Ball, and Holt and focussing on "interest" as the determinative criterion).
150. It is "hornbook law" that public funds can only be expended for public purposes. REYN-
OLDS, supra note 105, §100, at 304-05. There has been some dispute about whether direct assis-
tance to private businesses in the form of tax abatements or low-interest financing through pub-
licly issued bonds (general obligation or revenue) is a public purpose. Compare Common Cause v.
State, 455 A.2d I (Me. 1983) (holding that the use of state money to rehabilitate a dock which
was to be leased to a private company was within the legislature's power) with Mitchell v. North
Carolina Financing Auth., 159 S.E. 2d 745 (1968) (holding that a state cannot issue bonds to
encourage economic development if private persons would stand to benefit). As a general matter,
there is little dispute that the economic well-being of the citizenry is an appropriate state concern;
the question is means, not ends.
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land clearance and urban redevelopment,151 should those private
corporations be entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity simply
because they are performing functions which might be considered
"state" functions? It is not my purpose to answer these questions.
Suffice it to say that in order to accept the argument in its full
scope, one must be prepared to blur the distinction between the pub-
lic and private spheres, certainly for Eleventh Amendment purposes
if not for other aspects of constitutional jurisprudence as well., 52
B. Protecting the Means of Governance - The Public Fisc
Arguably, both the Eleventh Amendment and common law doc-
trines of sovereign immunity are primarily concerned with protect-
ing the public treasury from judicially-mandated transfer payments.
The major Eleventh Amendment cases, from United States v. Pe-
ters 51 in 1809 to Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation v. Fee-
ney'15  in 1990, have involved suits in which monies have been
claimed from a state or political subdivision's treasury. As early as
1821, in Cohens v. Virginia,155 Chief Justice Marshall commented
that the purpose of the Eleventh Amendment was not to generally
protect the states from the affront of having to defend a claim in a
"foreign" court, but to protect the state from having to defend
claims asserted by "persons who might probably be its creditors.""'
More recently, in Quern v. Jordan,57 the Court, in articulating the
requirement that Congress be explicit if it intends to waive a state's
Eleventh Amendment immunity, hinted that the degree of explicit-
ness might depend on the potential fiscal impact of Congress's ac-
tion. 158 Protecting the public fisc is also the major reason for the
common law doctrine of sovereign immunity. 59
151. See, e.g., New York Private Housing Fin. Law §§ 570-82 (McKinney 1976) (establishing
the Housing Development Fund Companies); OHIO REv. CODE §§ 1728.01 - .13 (Baldwin 1986)
(establishing nonprofit community urban redevelopment corporations).
152. This theory has been advocated by several scholars. E.g., Frug, The City, supra note 71,
at 1128-41; Carol Rose, The Ancient Constitution vs. the Federalist Empire: Anti-Federalism
From the Attack on "Monarchism" to Modern Localism, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 74, 98 (1989).
153. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115 (1809).
154. 495 U.S. 299 (1990).
155. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
156. Id. at 406.
157. 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
158. Id. at 344-45 n.16.
159. 5 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS § 29.3, at 603 (2d ed. 1986). See
generally Louis L. Jaffee, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HARV. L.
REv. 209 (1963) (analyzing the damage action as a method of providing relief against governmen-
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Despite this, Lincoln County distinguishes between public monies
in the hands of the state, which are immune from private attach-
ment, and public monies in the hands of a local entity the state has
created to do its bidding, which are not immune from private at-
tachment. Arguably, this makes little sense since a dollar of public
money "lost" to a private creditor is lost in the same way and with
the same impact, irrespective of the account in which it is resting.
However, it is hard - either historically or currently - to view
the Eleventh Amendment only in fiscal terms. Certainly Pennsylva-
nia's fisc was placed in jeopardy by the result in United States v.
Peters.16 0 Just as certainly, the state's fisc was not helped by the
prospective/retrospective relief distinction drawn by the Court in
Milliken v. Bradley, 6' when it required the state of Michigan to
pay for certain compensatory education programs. Indeed, Professor
Gerald Frug's comment that the prospective/retrospective distinc-
tion has nothing to do with a state's fiscal integrity 162 is precisely
the point: sovereignty itself is more significant to Eleventh Amend-
ment analysis than the fiscal argument can admit. 63 Once sover-
eignty is injected into the Eleventh Amendment, the distinction be-
tween a state and a local political subdivision becomes not only
understandable, but maybe defensible as well. 64
Even if admittedly arcane concepts of sovereignty are excised
from the Eleventh Amendment discussion in favor of some broader
concept of autonomy, 65 it is not clear that this would lead to Elev-
tal misconduct and outlining several factors for determining the sovereign immunity of state
officers).
160. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115, 138-39 (1809) (upholding federal jurisdiction when a private
claimant sought to compel a state officer to pay him damages from a state fund held in the private
estate of the deceased state treasurer).
161. 433 U.S. 267, 288-89 (1977).
162. FRUG. The Power of the Purse, supra note 16, at 752-53.
163. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. 491 U.S. 1, 37 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (stating that "Hans was ... enunciating a fundamental principle of feder-
alism, evidenced by the Eleventh Amendment, that the States retained their sovereign prerogative
of immunity") (emphasis added).
164. Stare decisis may make it difficult for a court to cut the Eleventh Amendment loose from
its sovereignty moorings. See Suzanna Sherry, The Eleventh Amendment and Stare Decisis: Over-
ruling Hans v. Louisiana, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1260 (1990) (asserting that overruling Hans would
not violate stare decisis because Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), so undermines
the rationale of Hans that its continuing vitality is no longer justified).
165. Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process, supra note 62, at 402. Even then, one must be
careful to distinguish between fiscal autonomy from federal legislative interferences and fiscal
autonomy from federal judicial interferences. TRIBE. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 59, §§ 3-
26, at 185. The state's fisc is not immune even from direct exactions imposed by Congress. See,
e.g., Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444 (1978) (upholding a federal registration tax on
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enth Amendment protection of the local government's treasury. Ju-
dicial precedent supporting local, as distinct from state, autonomy is
hard to come by. Professor Briffault mentions a number of cases
which he asserts make the argument for the Court's recognition of
"localism" as a distinct constitutional value.166 Cases such as Avery
v. Midland County,'67 Milliken v. Bradley,' San Antonio Indepen-
dent School District v. Rodriguez,69 Town of Hallie v. City of Eau
Claire,170 and City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 7 '
arguably establish the Court's willingness to give some Constitu-
tional imprimatur to local governmental units. To this list I would
add Rizzo v. Goode,12 which held that federalism concerns limited
the Court's ability to remedy abusive police practices by the city of
Philadelphia. 3
Since I do not find that most of these cases are terribly persuasive
in establishing a general constitutional commitment to "localism," I
am hesitant to conclude that they provide sufficient reasons for re-
considering Lincoln County, even on broadly-based local autonomy
grounds. Avery, for example, had far less to do with localism than it
did with a principle of equality,174 which says that persons equally
interested in a political body must have equal participatory rights in
that body. It is true that the result is "local," but its focus is not.
Rather, both Avery and its progeny focus less on the local govern-
mental unit than on the powers which the state has given that gov-
ernment. 75 Even Rodriguez, which seemingly placed a high consti-
aircraft owned by a state and used by state police); New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572
(1946) (holding that profits earned by a state from selling mineral waters were taxable in the
same way as profits earned by private persons). A fortiori, Congress can impose indirect burdens
on a state's treasury. E.g., New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992); South Carolina v.
Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988). Cf South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (holding that Con-
gress can require the states to choose between complying with federal policy or refusing federal
grant funds).
166. Briffault, Part 1, supra note 16, at 86-115 (arguing that these and other cases are incon-
sistent with the "stateist" position of Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907)). Profes-
sor Briffault does not force the argument to the Eleventh Amendment; that is solely my doing.
167. 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
168. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
169. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
170. 471 U.S. 34 (1985).
171. 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
172. 423 U.S. 362 (1976). Even this list is not exhaustive. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust
and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J. LAW & EcON. 23, 36-37 n.31 (1983) (citing additional
cases evidencing federal judicial concern for local governmental autonomy).
173. Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 379-80.
174. Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 476-77, 482-86 (1968).
175. Id. at 482.
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tutional value on local funding of local school districts, in reality did
nothing more than validate the state's choice to provide a local
funding mechanism in order to preserve the state's choice for local
control.'17  A state's decision to centralize funding would be equally
impervious to fourteenth amendment scrutiny. And in Milliken, a
Fourteenth Amendment "remedies" case, the Court did not so much
recognize the sanctity of local school boundaries as it recognized the
sanctity of state drawn school district lines.177 Likewise, the Court's
concern in the zoning cases cited by Professor Briffault was the
scope of various individual rights - property, 78 associational, 79
and equality. 80 Any validation of local legislative authority which
might have resulted from those holdings had to do with the burden
of overcoming governmental regulation, not with the level of the
regulating government. As indicated in Part 1, no one doubts that
local governmental units are "states" for purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment. These cases, then, are consistent with Eleventh
Amendment doctrine which recognizes the state, not its local subdi-
visions, as the constitutionally protected governing unit.
It is true that in Town of Ha/lie, the Court seemed to modify the
required identity between the state and its local political subdivi-
sions in order for the latter to claim antitrust immunity under
Parker v. Brown,' 8' apparently giving local governments some inde-
pendent discretion to engage in anti-competitive behavior. 8 It is
176. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 48-53 (1973) (holding that the
decentralization of funding is a state policy).
177. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 742-44 (1974) (stating that local control of schools is a
state decision).
178. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
179. Village of Belle Terre v. Borras, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
180. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977);
James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
181. 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (upholding a state requirement that raisin growers place most of
their crop under an industry committee's marketing control even though 95 percent of the crop
was usually sold out-of-state).
182. The question in Hallie was whether the town, which provided sewage treatment to a two-
county area, could "tie" that service to sewage collection and transportation without violating the
antitrust laws. The Court held that a general delegation of authority from a state to its local
political subdivisions is sufficient to constitute state permission to engage in uncompetitive behav-
ior if that behavior could reasonably be expected to result from the delegated authority. Town of
Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 42 (1985). See also City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor
Advertising, Inc., III S. Ct. 1344 (1991) (upholding the Parker exemption for a local billboard
regulation under general zoning authority from the state.) In addition, the Hallie Court held that
a state's immunity will attach even if the state does not engage in active supervision of the local
government's anti-competitive activity. Hallie, 471 U.S. at 46. It is true that the distinction be-
tween states and local governments for purposes of antitrust liability is informed by Eleventh
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still unclear, however, the extent to which one can generalize from
an implicit statutory immunity (that even under Town of Hallie re-
mains state immunity, not local immunity) to a general constitu-
tional equation of states with local governments for purposes of the
Eleventh Amendment.
Rizzo is somewhat more compelling. Both implicitly and in its
specific language,83 the Court equated the governmental apparatus
of a local government with that of a state. Moreover, like the Elev-
enth Amendment, the principle of federalism recognized in Rizzo
constrains the judiciary. 84 While Rizzo had far more to do with
governmental structures and processes than with fiscal concerns, the
importance of the former to our dual system of government is cer-
tainly equal to that of the latter.185 The major weakness in the anal-
ogy is that the Rizzo Court may have been less concerned with pre-
serving local prerogatives than with its own lack of expertise in
supervising day-to-day administrative functions, at whatever level of
government those functions might be performed. Indeed, the general
language, analysis, and result in Rizzo can also be found in cases
involving state institutions such as prisons8 and, under the guise of
separation of powers, federal institutions such as the military."'
Thus, the Court in Rizzo may have been more concerned with ques-
tions regarding the role of the judiciary than with questions of local
autonomy, fisc or otherwise.
Although it would be difficult for local political subdivisions to
Amendment doctrine. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 52-54
(1982). It is nevertheless "common law adjudication under the Sherman Act." Easterbrook, supra
note 172, at 36. Consequently, it is hard to assume that state immunity from the antitrust laws
will work to inform Eleventh Amendment doctrine. It may be even more difficult to assume that
the Court might use Hallie as a theoretical basis for reconsidering Lincoln County.
183. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 380 (1976) (stating that "[federalism] is sought . . .
against . . . an executive branch . . . of state or local governments").
184. In some respects, the Rizzo Court's decision to refrain from supervising the Philadelphia
police department resembles similar judicial hesitancy in deference to state decision-makers. For
example, federal courts will abstain when there are unanswered questions of state law which will
dispose of the federal claim (the so-called Pullman abstention), when state regulatory schemes
might be disrupted by federal judicial intervention (the so-called Buford abstention), and when
there is an on-going state judicial proceeding which is adequate to the task (the so-called Younger
abstention). There is no indication that the Court in any way distinguishes between state and local
proceedings in determining whether to abstain under any of these doctrines. See, e.g., Harris
County Comm'rs Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77 (1975) (discussing the Pullman abstention
doctrine).
185. E.g., New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2429-35 (1992); FERC v. Mississippi,
456 U.S. 742, 771-79 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
186. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
187. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507-08 (1986).
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acquire Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity "on their own," it
may be possible to argue that they should ride the coattails of the
states' sovereign immunity. Professor Frug, for example, argues that
since state subventions make up a substantial portion of local politi-
cal subdivision revenues, any judgment rendered against a political
subdivision has a "corresponding impact on the state."'188 A related
argument asserts that certain functions of local political subdivisions
are so essential to the citizens as citizens of the state that if the
local unit were to default, the state would either be "obligated" to
step in and provide the service directly or, if the state could catch
the default early enough, force the local unit to readjust its budget-
ary priorities.' 89
The case is easiest to make if the state constitution mandates that
a particular service be provided, such as a "fair and efficient" edu-
cation.1 90 But even absent such a specific clause, a state can hardly
stand by while a local governmental unit decides to sacrifice munici-
pal police and fire protection in favor of a municipal baseball sta-
dium. The point is that with respect to these services, the monies
which the local government spends are only proxies for the monies
which the state would otherwise have to spend. The problem with
both of these arguments is that they, like the arguments discussed in
the previous sections, rely on an identity between the state and its
local political subdivisions. Put another way, these arguments im-
plicitly accept the current state of Eleventh Amendment law, in-
cluding all of its sovereignty baggage, with the exception, of course,
of Lincoln County.
Professor Frug's argument that state subventions create an iden-
tity of local money with that of the state is inconsistent with other
areas of constitutional doctrine. For example, when the United
States enters into a cost-plus agreement with a defense contractor,
188. Frug, Power of the Purse. supra note 16, at 756 n.217. See also Pennhurst State Sch. &
Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 123-24 n.34 (1984) (raising the spectra of Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity for state-funded, locally-administered programs on the theory that a judgment
"runs against the state"). The Pennhurst Court did not decide the immunity of local officials on
that basis, however; the Court preferred to rest its decision on the incompleteness of any relief
against only county employees and the degree of cooperation required between state and county
officials. Id. at 123-24. In short, the Court seemed to consider state and county officials to be
partners in operating the state's mental health facilities.
189. Cf. Michelman, supra note 13 (arguing that sovereignty can also be understood as a ser-
vice role implying duties and obligations); Tribe, New Federalism. supra note 13 (claiming that
National League offers support for asserting personal rights to basic local services).
190. E.g., N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § IV (I); PA. CONST. art. II, § 14.
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that contractor cannot "piggy-back" on the federal government's
claim of immunity from state taxation simply because the federal
government is obligated to pay that tax bill. 191 Moreover, the fact
that the state may contribute significantly to a non-state entity does
not convert the latter into a state entity for purposes of the Four-
teenth Amendment. 92 Admittedly, these are examples of public
subsidies to what are undeniably otherwise private entities, whereas
Lincoln County deals with public entities. Unfortunately, the Lin-
coln County Court recognized no difference between private entities
and local political subdivisions for purposes of the Eleventh Amend-
ment.' 93 Although that view of local political subdivisions may be
wrong, it is not for reasons of a state subsidy. More to the point, in
one of the earliest Eleventh Amendment cases, United States v. Pe-
ters,' the Court upheld federal jurisdiction when a private claim-
ant sought to compel a state officer to pay him damages from a fund
rightfully owned by the state. When the state asserted that the Elev-
enth Amendment barred the federal court's jurisdiction, the Court
answered that because that money was held in the private estate of
the late treasurer of Pennsylvania, the Eleventh Amendment did not
apply.195 The fact that the state was the equitable owner of that
fund was not sufficient to invoke the Eleventh Amendment. 96 That
ruling.clearly covers the first argument, regarding state subventions
to local governmental units, and is probably broad enough to encom-
pass the second as well.
Moreover, the second argument, which posits that the state will
have to make up any shortfall in certain services, is nothing more
than the functional argument with a fiscal cast. Like the functional
argument, the line which divides those functions for which the state
191. Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1 (1941); see also United States v. Detroit, 355
U.S. 466 (1958) (holding that a private party is not exempt from state property tax by reason of a
federal reimbursement agreement).
192. See, e.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) (holding that the State of New York's
subsidization, funding, and licensing of a nursing home does not make the actions and decisions of
that home those of the state); Ascherman v. Presbyterian Hosp. of Pac. Med. Ctr., Inc., 507 F.2d
1103 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding that a hospital's receipt of federal funds was not sufficient to turn
actions of a private hospital into those of the state). Cf Rendel-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830
(1982) (stating that the receipt of government funding does not mean a private actor is operating
'under color of state law" for purposes of § 1983).
193. See supra notes 66-76 and accompanying text (explaining why local political subdivisions
are not equally sovereign and entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment).
194. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115, 139 (1809).
195. Id. at 138.
196. Id. at 139-40.
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itself is ultimately responsible from those for which it is not is too
fuzzy to serve as a constitutional boundary. To be repetitive, the
Court has rejected what amounts to a governmental/proprietary dis-
tinction as being helpful to understanding the boundaries of both
the Eleventh Amendment and the broader principles of structural
federalism embodied in the Tenth Amendment.
The "riding the coattails of state sovereign immunity" argument
can also be asserted in broader federalism terms as federal interfer-
ence with a state's decision to delegate governance responsibilities to
local subdivisions. Put doctrinally, Lincoln County cannot be recon-
ciled with the principle of federal constitutional neutrality implicit
in Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh" and its recent progeny." 8 Hunter
involved a Pennsylvania statute which permitted one city to annex
another with the approval of a simple majority of those in both cit-
ies. The plaintiffs, who were residents of the city of Allegheny,
sought to have the statute declared unconstitutional as a violation of
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 99 The Court
denied the plaintiffs' claim, deciding that the federal Constitution
has nothing to say about the manner in which a state distributes
political authority within its boundaries.200 Hunter requires federal
neutrality with respect to structural or institutional issues between a
state and its local governing units.20' Put another way, Hunter in-
197. 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
198. Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60 (1978) (upholding the city's police
jurisdiction statute and ruling that a governmental unit may legitimately restrict the right to par-
ticipate in its political processes to individuals who reside within the city limits).
199. Hunter, 207 U.S. at 171-72.
200. Id. at 178-79; see also Holt Civic Club, 439 U.S. at 73-75 (stating that the Court does not
sit to determine whether a legislature chose the soundest and most practical form of internal
government possible).
201. The claim for neutrality required by Hunter is somewhat overstated. In Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1964), the Court struck down Alabama's redrawing of Tuskegee's
boundaries in order to exclude blacks from voting, arguably demonstrating that citizens do have
some federal constitutional claim to local representation. However, the claim in Gomillion was
discrimination - that blacks and whites were treated differently simply because of their skin
color. Id. at 340-42. In that sense the case was no different from one in which the state of Ala-
bama would have ordered all blacks to leave the city; indeed, that is almost precisely what oc-
curred. Id. at 341. Cf Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding the exclusion
of individuals of Japanese ancestry from the coastal areas of the western United States during
World War 11); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I (1967) (banishing a couple from Virginia as
punishment for violating Virginia's anti-miscegenation statute). Hunter, on the other hand, was
not an equality claim; rather, it was founded on the due process "right" to be governed by one
particular local government instead of another. Hunter, 207 U.S. at 176-77. The former, not so
incidentally, had a lower tax rate. The question in Hunter was then really about money. Thus,
Hunter was in a very real sense Lochner all over again, but without the force of the "liberty to
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volved a dispute between two groups of citizens regarding which lo-
cal entity should govern them. The state, in permitting annexation
by a simple rather than a concurrent majority, mediated that dis-
pute in favor of those who resided in the larger community. The
Court saw no reason to overturn that decision; it respected the
state's choices. From that, it follows that the Court ought to respect
(by not impeding) a state's decision to delegate both service distri-
bution functions and the necessary fiscal powers to local govern-
ments. Lincoln County does not do that; at the very least, it imposes
a cost on the state for exercising that choice.
Answering that argument is not easy. Certainly, as a theoretical
matter, the liability of a local political subdivision makes certain
services more expensive when compared to a world of no liability if
the service is provided by the state, even if the only cost is that of
obtaining insurance. On an empirical level, however, it would be dif-
ficult to demonstrate that Lincoln County has in any way inhibited
or even influenced the states' choices about whether to delegate
powers or retain them. Both intuition and statistics suggest that lo-
cal political subdivisions have proliferated in this century despite
Lincoln County.20 2 So, while it is easy to argue that Lincoln County
interferes with a state's choices about how to structure its essential
governmental operations,20 3 it is difficult to demonstrate that the ar-
gument is anything but a theoretical construct. A potential threat to
state autonomy, which in more than one hundred years has not
panned out, hardly seems like much of a threat at all.
C. Local Autonomy and Principles of Self-Governance
Light might be shed on some of the questions left unanswered by
a functional analysis 20 4 if function is redefined to focus on a local
government's political role rather than its service distribution or reg-
ulatory role. As noted above, those who argue that our constitu-
contract" argument.
202. Between 1942 and 1987 (the earliest and latest figures available), there was a 46.3 percent
decline in the number of local governmental units, with the largest decline occurring between
1942 and 1952. 1 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1987 CENSUS OF GOVERN-
MENTS: GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION 1 (1988) [hereinafter CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS]. This
was due almost exclusively to school district consolidations, which reduced the number of those
units by more than one-half. Id. at Vi. Between 1972 and 1987, however, the number of local
governmental units increased. Id.
203. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981).
204. See supra note 149-52 and accompanying text (discussing functional analysis).
19941
DEPA UL LA W RE VIE W
tional structure was informed more by a collective than an individ-
ual view of human self-fulfillment 20 5 look upon local government as
the venue in which essential political discussions must occur.20 6
Thus viewed, it may be plausibly argued that those local entities
which are truly political, which have the redistributive regulatory
and/or taxing powers requiring equal per capita voting, ought to be
entitled to Eleventh Amendment protection." 7 Like states, these en-
tities have certain prerogatives, discretion if you will, to decide how
and to what extent the needs of their constituents will be satisfied.
This is true whether the entity is operating under Dillon's Rule or
under home rule. 20 8
Lincoln County, then, is inconsistent, at least in theory, with re-
publican principles of local self-governance in two ways. First, Lin-
coln County implicitly expresses a preference for governance at the
state rather than the local level. It does so by immunizing the state,
but not the local treasury, from attachment by the court of another
sovereign. In so doing, it leaves the state far greater policy and im-
plemental options than it leaves the local political subdivisions.
Second, as Gordon Clark notes, "For local autonomy to have any
strength, there must be a sphere of local immunity. 20 9 Immunity
for Clark is not limited to the immunity from federal court judg-
205. See, e.g., GORDON L. CLARK. JUDGES AND CITIES 27-32 (1985) (discussing the structural-
ist position where community associations bring about meaning as human beings); J.G.A. POCOCK,
THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT (1975) (discussing the Machiavellian era and its legacy of bal-
anced government, the republic, and citizen participation); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF
THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969) (discussing and explaining the creation of the Amer-
ican republican Constitution and the American political system); Frank I. Michelman, The Su-
preme Court, 1985 Term-Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1987)
(arguing for a dialogue in support of judicial practical reason as an aspect of judicial self-govern-
ment in the interest of freedom); Cass Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J.
1539 (1988) [hereinafter Sunstein, Republican Revival] (exploring aspects of republicanism and
how it can support group or proportional representation).
206. See supra note 14 (expressing the view that republicanism is best expressed in that level of
government which permits the maximum level of participation). It is likely that Public Choice
theorists would disagree that local government, rather than state government, is the appropriate
unit for defining and articulating the "public good" because of the local government's peculiar
susceptibility to "one-sided lobbying." They would indeed quarrel with the very concept of "public
good." See Clayton P. Gillette, In Partial Praise of Dillon's Rule, Or, Can Public Choice Theory
Justify Local Government Law?, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 959 (1991) (arguing that Dillon's Rule
functions as a check on local governments' tendency to cater to special interests at the expense of
other constituents).
207. Durchslag, Reappraising the Right, supra note 149.
208. CLARK, supra note 205, at 70-75 (noting that sovereignty is frequently not absolute, but
rather a matter of degree). See supra note 72 and accompanying text (describing Dillon's Rule).
209. CLARK, supra note 205, at 7.
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ments contemplated by the Eleventh Amendment. Rather it is, more
broadly, the ability of a local political subdivision to make political
decisions without the fear that those decisions will be revised by a
higher authority. Even within the limited sphere of immunity con-
templated by the Eleventh Amendment, the municipality is subject
to greater revisionary actions by the federal court than is the
state."' 0
The question is whether these factors necessarily dictate that Lin-
coln County be reconsidered. Certainly, a second look at Eleventh
Amendment municipal immunity would be consistent with the ef-
forts of those constitutional scholars who have been attempting to
mesh constitutional theory211 and doctrine2 12 with the historical in-
sights provided by J.G.A. Pocok, Gordon Wood, and others. There
is certainly enough ammunition to do so, even though much of the
ammunition is not easily adaptable to the rifling on the weapon.
Nor, I suppose, should the fact that a significant amount of disa-
greement still exists about whether such a venture is appropriate 13
be an impediment to a reconsideration of Lincoln County. The hold-
ing, after all, has little foundation other than the general state of the
law regarding state/local structural relationships. However, state
law does not necessarily dictate results under the Eleventh Amend-
ment. This is evidenced by the Court's holding that a state's general
waiver of sovereign immunity "in any court of competent jurisdic-
tion" does not waive that state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. 1 4
210. A clear example of this is the availability of the "state action" defense to a state or state
entity under Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). Parker held, among other things, that private,
noncompetitive behavior is immune from the federal antitrust laws if done pursuant to state regu-
latory policy, absent a clearly expressed federal policy to the contrary. Id. The same defense,
however, is not available to local governments. In order for local governments to assert the Parker
defense, the local government must demonstrate that its actions "constitute the action of the State
. . . itself in its sovereign capacity, . . . or . . . municipal action in furtherance or implementa-
tion of clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy .... " Community Communi-
cations Co. v. Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 52 (1982). But cf Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. 34 (1985)
(holding that a city's anticompetitive activities were protected by a state action exemption to
federal antitrust laws); see also supra note 182 (explaining the issues involved in Hallie).
211. See, e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 14 (discussing republican federalism); Linda R. Hirshman,
The Virtue of Liberality in American Communal Life, 88 MICH. L. REV. 983 (1990) (applying
the classic virtue of "liberality" rather than a rights theory to a discussion of claims for
retribution).
212. See, e.g., Hoke, supra note 14 (proposing a fundamental restructuring of the preemption
doctrine by reconsidering federalism in light of direct participation in the political process).
213. E.g., Steven G. Gey, The Unfortunate Revival of Civic Republicanism, 141 U. PA. L. REV.
801 (1993); Fallon, supra note 14.
214. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 327 U.S. 573 (1946). The Court, however,
would recognize an explicit waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal court as a waiver
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There are at least two difficulties with relying on republican no-
tions of self-government as the primary theoretical basis for recon-
sidering Lincoln County. First, many local political subdivisions
which possess both the indicia of political bodies and have the requi-
site independence from the state, either in terms of the initiative
and/or immunity"' necessary to avoid doing total violence to
whatever sense the Eleventh Amendment has, are not the kind of
local governing authorities in which political discussions concerning
civic virtue are likely to occur; they are simply too large. As
Kathryn Abrams aptly noted, "If accessibility and identifiability of
common norms are crucial, it may be useful to start at the sub-local
or neighborhood level."21 However, there are few such sub-local en-
tities sufficiently political to justify distinguishing them from water
storage districts or transit authorities. Those that are, such as neigh-
borhood school boards in New York or Chicago, are hardly exam-
ples of venues in which the "community good" has been systemati-
cally pursued.
Second, and more important, there are costs entailed in revising
Eleventh Amendment doctrine to equate states and local political
subdivisions. It is to that issue which the next and last section of this
Article turns.
IV. ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AUTONOMY AT A COST
If Eleventh Amendment immunity is extended to local political
subdivisions, there will be an unfortunate "tradeoff:" the cause of
individual liberties will likely suffer a serious setback. The Court in
Monell v. Department of Social Services217 held that the word "per-
son" in Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act218 includes municipali-
ties and other local political subdivisions.1 9 The Court's decision
was based on a reading of the congressional history of the 1871
Civil Rights Act which it said demonstrated that the Court's hold-
ing accurately reflected congressional intent. In reaching this deci-
of a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity.
215. See CLARK. supra note 205, at 60-75 (discussing several cases illustrating this view).
216. Abrams, supra note 14, at 1606. But cf. Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J.
1493 (1988) [hereinafter Michelman, Law's Republic] (stating that the Court itself can be the
focus of a republican discourse of law and suggesting that "jurisgenerative politics" provides a
check against a pluralist political society).
217. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
218. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
219. Monell, 436 U.S. at 669-90.
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sion, the Court read congressional intent far differently than did the
Court in Monroe v. Pape,22 ° which held that "person" was not in-
tended to include political subdivisions. 221 As a result of Monell, in-
dividuals can sue local governments for damages resulting from fed-
eral constitutional and statutory violations. Lincoln County
precludes any argument for immunity based on the Eleventh
Amendment.
This is not true of an individual's right to recover damages from
the state for similar constitutional or statutory violations. First,
Quern v. Jordan222 held that Section 1983 is not sufficiently explicit
in its intention to waive the states' Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity.223 Ten years later, in Will v. Michigan State Police,224 the
Court went even further, holding that states are not "persons"
within the meaning of Section 1983, thus precluding a Section 1983
claim in state as well as federal court.225 Absent an explicit state-
ment from Congress creating an individual claim for damages
against the state,226 an individual's only recourse is to sue a state
220. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled by Monell, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
221. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 191-92.
222. 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
223. Id. at 345.
224. 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
225. Id. at 71.
226. See, e.g,. Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230 (1989) ("Lest Atascadero be thought to
contain any ambiguity, we reaffirm today that in this area of the law, evidence of congressional
intent must be both unequivocal and textual."). The idea that Congress can waive a state's Elev-
enth Amendment immunity is generally supported by Eleventh Amendment scholars. See, e.g.,
Field, Congressional Imposition, supra note 43 (addressing Congress's power to overrule state
immunity); Massey, supra note 43 (stating that Congress can waive immunity except to the extent
that the Eleventh Amendment prohibits it); Nowak, supra note 43 (analyzing the Eleventh
Amendment's failure to draw distinctions between Congress's power to create a private cause of
action and judicial power to imply such a cause of action); Laurence Tribe, Intergovernmental
Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in Controver-
sies About Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REV. 682 (1976) (arguing that the ultimate authority in
determining intergovernmental immunity should be reserved to Congress); cf. George D. Brown,
Beyond Pennhurst - Protective Jurisdiction, The Eleventh Amendment, and the Power of Con-
gress to Enlarge Federal Jurisdiction in Response to the Burger Court, 71 VA. L. REV. 343
(1985) (stating that Congress has authority to overrule Pennhurst 11). Contra, Joseph J. Jablon-
ski, Jr., The Eleventh Amendment: An Affirmative Limit on the Commerce Clause Power of
Congress - A Doctrinal Foundation, 37 DEPAUL L. REV. 547 (1988) (arguing that Eleventh
Amendment doctrine creates a positive restriction on Congress's power under the Commerce
Clause). The Court has held that Congress can waive a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity
when legislating under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Dellmuth. 491 U.S. at 227; Fitzpatrick
v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 446 (1976). Whether Congress has the same authority when acting pur-
suant to its Article I powers now may be in some doubt, as four members of the Court said that
Congress does have such authority in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 13-23 (1989).
Four Justices, however, disagreed. Id. at 35-36 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
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officer under Ex Parte Young2 27 to enjoin further violations of her
federal constitutional liberties. This cuts off the primary statutory
device by which individuals can be made whole when the state fails
to adhere to federal constitutional norms.2 28 Now the punch line is
obvious; if local political subdivisions are treated as states for pur-
poses of Eleventh Amendment immunity, that decision, by itself,
would overrule Monell and thus immunize all political subdivisions
from damage claims in federal court for violations of federally pro-
tected liberties.229
It is possible to reassert Monell in the context of current Eleventh
Amendment doctrine by arguing that it established Congress's in-
tent in Section 1983 to waive local, as opposed to state, Eleventh
Amendment immunity. The Court's opinion in Atascadero State
Hospital v. Scanlon210  makes that argument problematic. The
Court in Atascadero held that if Congress is to waive a state's Elev-
enth Amendment immunity, it must "mak[e] its intention unmistak-
ably clear in the text of the statute."'2' 1 The Monell Court relied on
legislative history, not statutory text, in reaching the determination
that local political subdivisions are "persons" for purposes of Sec-
tion 1983. Moreover, even if it would be permissible to rely on legis-
lative history to assist in interpreting ambiguous statutory language,
that legislative history, as indicated by Monroe, is hardly
"unmistakable."
This state of affairs might not be so bad. First, the cause of civil
part). Since Union Gas was decided, two members of the plurality, Justices William Brennan and
Thurgood Marshall, have resigned. See generally Jackson, One Hundred Years of Folly, supra
note 22, at 62-76 (analyzing the Union Gas decision and Brennan's opinion supporting Congress's
power to abrogate state immunity).
227. 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (permitting federal courts to enjoin unconstitutional state policies
and practices).
228. Since states are not persons within the meaning of § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, claims
in state court are precluded as well. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
229. See Michael J. Gerhart, The Monell Legacy. Balancing Federalism Concerns and Munici-
pal Accountability Under Section 1983, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 539 (1989) (arguing that there is a
significant overlap between the Eleventh Amendment and the Court's treatment of local political
subdivisions under § 1983). If the Court were to overrule Lincoln County because it was wrongly
decided, even by 1890 understandings, it might use the reasoning found in Will, - "in deci-
phering congressional intent as to the scope of [Section] 1983, the scope of the Eleventh Amend-
ment is a consideration...," to hold that local political subdivisions, like states, are not persons
within the meaning of § 1983. Will, 491 U.S. at 66-67. The fact that Hans was decided after
Congress enacted § 1983 was unimportant to the Court's "historical" analysis in Will. Id. at 66
n.6. Presumably, it would be equally unimportant if the Court were to overrule Monell.
230. 473 U.S. 234 (1989).
231. Id. at 242; see also Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230 (1989) (citing Atascadero).
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liberties have survived, even flourished, despite state Eleventh
Amendment immunity. Why should they not equally survive after
extending Eleventh Amendment immunity to political subdivisions?
Second, Eleventh Amendment immunity is limited; all that it does is
prohibit actions for damages against the state. Ex Parte Young,232
fiction though it is, still permits a federal court to enjoin unconstitu-
tional policies and practices. This will not change simply because we
extend Eleventh Amendment immunity to local governmental units.
The first argument is factually correct. Indeed, if the issue were
survival, the argument would be unassailable. However, if the issue
is whether a rule - one which is certainly not compelled by any
rationale of the Eleventh Amendment - should be adopted if there
will be a clear sacrifice to individual liberties, a "yes" answer be-
comes difficult. More importantly, there will have to be some sacri-
fices. There are fifty states, and the number of local political subdi-
visions which have the kind of regulatory, taxing, and enforcement
powers which give rise to claims of unconstitutional excesses ap-
proaches 54,000.238 This, coupled with the fact that states have dele-
gated more and more of the day-to-day regulation and service func-
tions of government to a variety of local political subdivisions means
that the individual is more likely to encounter a local than a state
official.234 Everyone from the police and fire officer to the welfare
case worker to the nurse at the local public hospital is more likely to
be on the local payroll than that of the state. Consequently, the
chances of an individual encountering unconstitutional behavior
from a local official are far greater than the chances of encountering
similar behavior by a state officer. If we are going to have an effec-
tive federal incentive to comply with federal constitutional norms,
and actions for damages in some way serve as such an incentive,285
232. 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment does not prevent federal
courts from issuing an injunction against state officials).
233. The actual figure is 53,654. CENSUS OF GOVERNMENT, supra note 202, at VI. This in-
cludes counties, municipalities, townships, and school districts. Id. Excluded from this figure are
29,532 special districts such as water districts, sewer districts, and fire protection districts. Id.
Ordinarily these districts have relatively few employees, and their powers are not those which in
their ordinary day-to-day operations give rise to violations of constitutional liberties.
234. As of October 1987, there were nearly 2.5 times more local government employees than
state employees. 3 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENT, supra note 202, at V. Of these, only 529,000 -
about five percent - are employed by special districts. Id. at VI. The rest are employed by mu-
nicipalities, counties, townships, and school districts, with most being employed by school districts
and municipalities. Id.
235. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 651-52 (1980). See also TRIBE, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW, supra note 59, § 3-25, at 173 (stating that "[t]he Eleventh Amendment lies at the
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it is more important to apply that incentive at the local level, where
the most significant impact is likely to be felt.
Why are actions for damages needed at all so long as the federal
courts are open to equitable relief? After all, it was injunctive relief
which desegregated our local schools,"'8 improved our local penal
institutions,3 ' prevented local governments from unduly burdening
rights of choice,238 and ensured that racial and political gerryman-
dering do not limit equal participation rights.2 39 The simple answer
is that injunctions are not always available. As Rizzo told us, feder-
alism concerns may prevent injunctive relief, leaving damages
against the local political subdivision as the only effective remedy
for seemingly random, yet pervasive abuses by individual police
officers. 40
Finally, while a Section 1983 damage claim against the offending
local official will exist regardless of the way in which the Eleventh
Amendment is interpreted, that is not a terribly satisfactory remedy
for one concerned with ensuring that abuses do not become sys-
temic. In addition to all the reasons that generally support imposing
center of the tension between state sovereign immunity and the desire to have in place mecha-
nisms for the effective vindication of federal rights"); Barbara R. Snyder, The Final Authority
Analysis: A Unified Approach to Municipal Liability Under Section 1983, 1986 Wisc. L. REV.
633, 659 (discussing the theory that the final authority test to municipal liability under § 1983
serves to deter and compensate). The conventional wisdom of subjecting local governments to
liability without fault under § 1983 has been disputed by Professor John Jeffries. John C. Jeffries,
Jr., Compensation for Constitutional Torts: Reflections on the Significance of Fault, 88 MICH. L.
REV. 82 (1989). Professor Jeffries rejects the usual justifications for compensating people for gov-
ernmentally inflicted constitutional wrongs; he prefers instead to rest on "corrective justice." Id. at
93. This requires an assessment of fault, a direct contradiction of the result in Owen.
236. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 2 (1971).
237. E.g., Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1980); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318
(M.D. Ala. 1976).
238. Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983), overruled in part by
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
239. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (racial gerrymandering); Davis v. Bandemer,
478 U.S. 109 (1986) (political gerrymandering).
240. Monell's requirement that the plaintiff prove a policy or custom before a municipality can
be held liable make damages against municipalities difficult to prove under the circumstances
posited in the text. See generally Gerhart, supra note 229 (stating that the policy or custom
requirement is the device by which the court balances the need to vindicate federal constitutional
violations with concerns for local autonomy). The gap which some litigants tried to open in the
policy or custom requirement, holding a political subdivision liable for failing to adequately train
its employees, was largely closed by Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989). The Canton Court
held that inadequate police training could be the basis of a Section 1983 action only where the
failure to train evidenced a "deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police
come into contact." Id. at 388. The Court's reason for limiting liability so severely was to remain
consistent with the more general policy and custom requirement. Id. at 389.
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liability on a principal when its agent has engaged in mis- or mal-
feasance," 1 a claim against an individual official is subject to the
defense that she reasonably believed that her actions were constitu-
tionally permissible," 2 but such defense is not available to the local
governmental unit.2 3
True adherents to classical republicanism, those who eschew judi-
cial protections in favor of the protections afforded by a deliberative
political process, might well find this state of affairs unobjection-
able. Certainly civic virtue would include collective responsibility for
collective wrongdoing, probably even collective negligence. Suffice it
to say that my optimism for political decision-making, even (maybe
most certainly) at the most local of levels, stops well short of that
point. It is important to temper devotion to political discourse with a
healthy dose of rights-based liberalism enforced by judicial review,
including the availability of monetary damages.244
241. HAROLD G. REUSCHLEIN & WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNER-
SHIP § 52, at 104 (2d ed. 1990); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 cmt. a (1958).
242. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
243. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
244. See Michelman, Law's Republic, supra note 216 (contending that through a reconsidera-
tion of republican constitutional thought, we can achieve a government of both people and laws);
Sunstein, Republican Revival, supra note 205, at 1551, 1569-71, 1579-81 (arguing that republi-
can theories are not hostile to the protection of individual or group autonomy from state control).
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